Reward Scheme Design for Online Crowdfunding Projects

Shengsheng Xiao, Tongxin Zhou, Yong Tan
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the optimal reward scheme design problem for online crowdfunding projects where project backers’ reward item selection is assumed to follow the multinomial logit choice model. Our model shows that project creator’s effective marginal profit from each reward item is the same at optimal backing prices, and the reward scheme design problem can be simplified to that of finding a fixed point of a single dimensional function. We also extend the basic model by considering crowdfunding participants’ behaviors such as backers’ altruistic motivation and heterogeneous beliefs in project’s success probability and project creator’s reward updating behavior. Finally, we conduct sensitivity analyses to examine the roles of key model parameters. This study provides theoretical and practical insights on reward design strategies for project creators in online crowdfunding market.
网络众筹项目奖励方案设计
本文研究了网络众筹项目的最优奖励方案设计问题,假设项目出资人的奖励项目选择遵循多项逻辑选择模型。我们的模型表明,在最优支持价格下,项目创建者从每个奖励项目中获得的有效边际利润是相同的,并且奖励方案设计问题可以简化为寻找单维函数的不动点问题。我们还对基本模型进行了扩展,考虑了众筹参与者的行为,如支持者的利他动机、项目成功概率的异质信念和项目创建者的奖励更新行为。最后,我们进行了敏感性分析,以检验关键模型参数的作用。本研究对网络众筹市场中项目创造者的奖励设计策略提供了理论和实践的见解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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