{"title":"Judicial Nominations to the Courts of Appeals and the Strategic Decision to Elevate","authors":"Mikel Norris","doi":"10.1080/0098261X.2020.1734510","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although presidents regularly elevate district court judges to fill appellate court vacancies, research to date suggests that presidents elevate judges who are further from their preferences than nominees outside the federal judiciary. Current research also does not offer a satisfactory answer of when and why presidents decide to elevate. I argue that presidents are likely to decide to elevate when they perceive political conditions that they think will lead to a nominee facing a difficult confirmation battle in the Senate. Once they decide to elevate, they then elevate judges further from their preferences, knowing they will have the conciliatory prize of being able to fill a newly opened district court seat. This argument is bolstered by recent work that theorizes that judicial nominations and confirmations are dynamic, and not one-shot activities that gridlock models of advice and consent would suggest. The results of this analysis bear out my hypotheses. Presidents typically elevate when the ideological balance of an appellate court is at stake and, when they do, they often elevate district judges who are further from their preferences than they otherwise would. In fact, the district judges they elevate frequently resemble ideologically the appellate judges they are replacing.","PeriodicalId":45509,"journal":{"name":"Justice System Journal","volume":"136 1","pages":"118 - 138"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2020-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Justice System Journal","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0098261X.2020.1734510","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Abstract Although presidents regularly elevate district court judges to fill appellate court vacancies, research to date suggests that presidents elevate judges who are further from their preferences than nominees outside the federal judiciary. Current research also does not offer a satisfactory answer of when and why presidents decide to elevate. I argue that presidents are likely to decide to elevate when they perceive political conditions that they think will lead to a nominee facing a difficult confirmation battle in the Senate. Once they decide to elevate, they then elevate judges further from their preferences, knowing they will have the conciliatory prize of being able to fill a newly opened district court seat. This argument is bolstered by recent work that theorizes that judicial nominations and confirmations are dynamic, and not one-shot activities that gridlock models of advice and consent would suggest. The results of this analysis bear out my hypotheses. Presidents typically elevate when the ideological balance of an appellate court is at stake and, when they do, they often elevate district judges who are further from their preferences than they otherwise would. In fact, the district judges they elevate frequently resemble ideologically the appellate judges they are replacing.
期刊介绍:
The Justice System Journal is an interdisciplinary journal that publishes original research articles on all aspects of law, courts, court administration, judicial behavior, and the impact of all of these on public and social policy. Open as to methodological approaches, The Justice System Journal aims to use the latest in advanced social science research and analysis to bridge the gap between practicing and academic law, courts and politics communities. The Justice System Journal invites submission of original articles and research notes that are likely to be of interest to scholars and practitioners in the field of law, courts, and judicial administration, broadly defined. Articles may draw on a variety of research approaches in the social sciences. The journal does not publish articles devoted to extended analysis of legal doctrine such as a law review might publish, although short manuscripts analyzing cases or legal issues are welcome and will be considered for the Legal Notes section. The Justice System Journal was created in 1974 by the Institute for Court Management and is published under the auspices of the National Center for State Courts. The Justice System Journal features peer-reviewed research articles as well as reviews of important books in law and courts, and analytical research notes on some of the leading cases from state and federal courts. The journal periodically produces special issues that provide analysis of fundamental and timely issues on law and courts from both national and international perspectives.