Subnational State Capacity and Pro-Government Voting in Russia

Abstract

This paper examines how the level of subnational administrative state capacity, measured as the success of the implementation of the May 2012 presidential decrees in the regions, affects the electoral support for the government. The research study focuses on the indicators that reflect the dynamics of the salaries of public sector workers (doctors, teachers etc.), which are considered one of the electoral groups that the authorities count on. The results of the study show that in regions with higher salaries, public sector workers tend to vote more actively for the government. According to the author’s conclusion, these findings not only demonstrate that a high level of subnational administrative state capacity has a positive effect on the loyalty of citizens, but also confirm the efficiency of a strategy of distributing material wealth for maintaining and strengthening stability of authoritarian states. At the same time, the study shows that salary manipulation as a tool to increase loyalty does not work in all cases, even when it comes to public sector workers. The same applies to such indicators of socio-economic development as the level of urbanization and the value of GRP per capita, which are negatively correlated with pro-government voting. All this indicates that, along with economic considerations, other factors also influence electoral behavior, which requires further research.