Caught Red-Handed: How States Wield Proof to Coerce Wrongdoers

IF 4.8 1区 社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Cullen G. Nutt, Reid B C Pauly
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Abstract States frequently acquire proof of other states' norm violations, from nuclear proliferation to harboring terrorists to interfering in elections. Existing theories do not fully explain how states that catch others red-handed wield a form of coercive power over the wrongdoers. Discoverers may conceal proof of wrongdoing, share such proof with other actors privately, or reveal their proof to the world. States with more leverage over wrongdoers have two incentives to conceal proof of wrongdoing. They can blackmail wrongdoers by threatening to go public with proof of their guilt, and they can simultaneously allow wrongdoers to save face. States that possess proof of wrongdoing but have less leverage are more likely to share that proof with others. If a discoverer distrusts the intentions of states with more leverage, it will reveal evidence publicly, catalyzing others to act. Publicizing proof weaponizes the prospect that other states will pay reputation and hypocrisy costs if they do not follow through on punishing norm violations. Four case studies of nuclear proliferation (Taiwan, Libya, South Africa, and North Korea) probe this novel theory.
当场抓获:国家如何运用证据来胁迫违法者
国家经常获得其他国家违反准则的证据,从核扩散到窝藏恐怖分子到干涉选举。现有的理论并不能完全解释国家如何在抓人的时候对不法分子施加某种形式的强制权力。发现者可能会隐藏不法行为的证据,私下与其他行为者分享这些证据,或者向世界公开他们的证据。对不法分子有更大影响力的国家有两个动机来隐瞒不法行为的证据。他们可以通过威胁公开犯罪证据来勒索犯罪者,同时也可以让犯罪者挽回颜面。拥有不法行为证据但影响力较小的国家更有可能与其他国家分享这些证据。如果一个发现者不相信拥有更大影响力的国家的意图,它将公开披露证据,促使其他国家采取行动。公开证据使其他国家如果不坚持惩罚违反规范的行为,就会付出名誉和虚伪的代价。四个核扩散案例研究(台湾、利比亚、南非和朝鲜)探讨了这一新颖的理论。
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来源期刊
International Security
International Security Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
7.40
自引率
10.00%
发文量
13
期刊介绍: International Security publishes lucid, well-documented essays on the full range of contemporary security issues. Its articles address traditional topics of war and peace, as well as more recent dimensions of security, including environmental, demographic, and humanitarian issues, transnational networks, and emerging technologies. International Security has defined the debate on US national security policy and set the agenda for scholarship on international security affairs for more than forty years. The journal values scholarship that challenges the conventional wisdom, examines policy, engages theory, illuminates history, and discovers new trends. Readers of IS discover new developments in: The causes and prevention of war U.S.-China relations Great power politics Ethnic conflict and intra-state war Terrorism and insurgency Regional security in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America U.S. foreign and defense policy International relations theory Diplomatic and military history Cybersecurity and defense technology Political economy, business, and security Nuclear proliferation.
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