Against Voluntarism about Doxastic Responsibility

IF 0.5 4区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2019-11-05 DOI:10.5840/jpr201944140

S. J. White

引用次数: 2

Abstract

According to the view Rik Peels defends in Responsible Belief (2017), one is responsible for believing something only if that belief was the result of choices one made voluntarily, and for which one may be held responsible. Here, I argue against this voluntarist account of doxastic responsibility and in favor of the rationalist position that a person is responsible for her beliefs insofar as they are under the influence of her reason. In particular, I argue that the latter yields a more plausible account of the conditions under which ignorance may serve as an excuse for wrongdoing.

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论义务责任的唯意志论

根据Rik Peels在《负责任的信念》(2017)中所捍卫的观点，只有当一个人的信念是他自愿做出的选择的结果，并且他可能为此负责时，他才有责任相信某件事。在这里，我反对这种唯意志论的责任解释，而支持理性主义的立场，即一个人对自己的信仰负责，只要这些信仰是在她的理性的影响下。特别是，我认为后者提供了一种更合理的解释，在这种情况下，无知可以作为不法行为的借口。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Philosophical Research PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.70

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Philosophical Research is an annual peer-reviewed journal uniquely committed to the advancement of all areas of philosophical inquiry. It publishes articles from any philosophical orientation, in English or French, that make a significant contribution to the field. A generous length limit provides an outlet for essential works such as bibliographies, translations, and commentaries that are difficult to publish because of unusual length or complex format. JPR is particularly interested in helping new authors and an outstanding group of referees provides written comments on submitted manuscripts.