Organization of the State: Home Assignment and Bureaucrat Performance

IF 1.3 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Guo Xu, Marianne Bertrand, R. Burgess
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

How to allocate personnel is a central question in the organization of the state. We link survey data on the performance of 1,472 elite civil servants in India to their personnel records between 1975-2005 to study how home allocations affect their performance and careers. Using exogenous variation in home assignment generated by an allocation rule, we find that bureaucrats assigned to their home states are perceived to be less effective and more likely to be suspended. These negative effects are driven by states with higher levels of corruption and cohorts with greater numbers of home state officers. ∗First draft: December 2017. This paper has benefited from comments of seminar participants at the NBER Organizational Economics Meeting, the University of Houston, Northwestern Kellogg, Uppsala, Columbia GSB, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics Summer Forum, UC Berkeley, UC Davis, Chicago Harris, the BPP-GEM workshop, the Stanford Quality of Governance workshop and the ABCDE World Bank conference. We thank Oriana Bandiera, Tim Besley, Michael Callen, Arunish Chawla, Ernesto Dal Bo, Esther Duflo, Miguel Espinosa, Fred Finan, Olle Folke, Guido Friebel, Saad Gulzar, Rema Hanna, Julien Labonne, Anandi Mani, Jan Pierskalla, Andrea Prat, Johanne Rickne, John de Figueiredo, Daniel Rogger for their valuable comments. Finally, we particularly thank a group of senior IAS officers for sharing their institutional knowledge, and Lakshmi Iyer and Anandi Mani for sharing their data on empanelment outcomes. Fraser Clark, Anton Heil, Rebecca Rose, Jinling Yang and Jiemin Xu provided excellent research assistance. A previous version of this paper has been circulated under the title “Social Proximity and Bureaucrat Performance: Evidence from India.” All errors remain our own. †Guo Xu (corresponding author): guo.xu@berkeley.edu; Marianne Bertrand: marianne.bertrand@chicagobooth.edu; Robin Burgess: r.burgess@lse.ac.uk.
国家组织:家庭分配与官僚绩效
如何配置人员是国家组织中的一个中心问题。我们将1975年至2005年间印度1472名精英公务员的绩效调查数据与他们的个人记录联系起来,研究住房分配如何影响他们的绩效和职业生涯。利用分配规则产生的家乡分配的外生变化,我们发现,被分配到家乡的官僚被认为效率较低,更有可能被停职。这些负面影响是由腐败程度较高的州和本国官员人数较多的州造成的。*初稿:2017年12月。本文受益于NBER组织经济学会议、休斯顿大学、西北凯洛格大学、乌普萨拉大学、哥伦比亚大学商学院、巴塞罗那经济研究生院夏季论坛、加州大学伯克利分校、加州大学戴维斯分校、芝加哥哈里斯大学、BPP-GEM研讨会、斯坦福大学治理质量研讨会和ABCDE世界银行会议与会者的评论。我们感谢Oriana Bandiera、Tim Besley、Michael Callen、Arunish Chawla、Ernesto Dal Bo、Esther Duflo、Miguel Espinosa、Fred Finan、Olle Folke、Guido Friebel、Saad Gulzar、Rema Hanna、Julien Labonne、Anandi Mani、Jan Pierskalla、Andrea Prat、Johanne Rickne、John de Figueiredo、Daniel roger的宝贵意见。最后,我们特别感谢一组国际会计协会高级官员分享他们的机构知识,感谢Lakshmi Iyer和Anandi Mani分享他们关于聘用结果的数据。Fraser Clark, Anton Heil, Rebecca Rose, Jinling Yang和Jiemin Xu提供了出色的研究协助。这篇论文的前一个版本以“社会接近和官僚绩效:来自印度的证据”为题分发。所有的错误都是我们自己的。†郭旭(通讯作者):guo.xu@berkeley.edu;Marianne Bertrand: marianne.bertrand@chicagobooth.edu;罗宾·伯吉斯:r.burgess@lse.ac.uk。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
25
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