Short-sale refinancing and earnings response coefficient: evidence from China

Abstract

Purpose Although short selling has been legalized in China for nearly 10 years, due to the existence of short-sale constraints, its impact on corporate governance of listed companies remains unclear. This paper aims to examine the impact of short-sale refinancing on earnings quality after the short-selling constraints have been released. The authors further explore whether this impact is subject to the nature of property rights and shareholding structures. Design/methodology/approach This study is based on a sample of A-share firms in China for the period 2014–2016. The authors use earnings response coefficients (ERC) as a proxy for earnings quality. To empirically examine this issue, a matching sample is generated by using propensity score matching method (PSM) to reduce sample selection bias. Findings This study provides evidence that deregulation of short selling has positive external effect on corporate governance. The results indicate that the potential short-selling opportunities can effectively suppress earnings manipulation and improve earnings quality. However, the impact of short selling on earnings quality varies for companies with different nature of property rights and shareholding structure. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the relationship between short selling and earnings quality in the unique setting of short-sale refinancing. This study provides new evidence on the impact of short selling at the micro level and calls for further deregulation of short selling. In addition, this study contributes to existing studies on short-sale refinancing by examining an emerging market.