Medicaid and Long-Term Care: The Effects of Penalizing Strategic Asset Transfers

Q3 Social Sciences
Junhao Liu, Anit Mukherjee
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Medicaid provides a critical source of insurance for long-term care, and individuals may strategically offload assets (typically to children) to meet the means-tested eligibility requirement. In this paper, we quantify the extent of such behavior using variation in the penalty for improper parent-to-child transfers induced by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. We estimate difference-in-differences models based on the hypothesis that only individuals with high levels of nursing home risk (high risk) will alter transfers because of the Act. We find that over a two-year horizon, high risk individuals reduced transfers to children on the extensive margin by 11 percent and that the average total amount of transfers decreased by $4,860. The results hold only for coupled respondents. We also conduct a triple-differences analysis to examine heterogeneity with financial literacy and find that even those with a low level of financial literacy responded to the penalty.
医疗补助和长期护理:惩罚战略性资产转移的影响
医疗补助为长期护理提供了一个重要的保险来源,个人可能会战略性地出售资产(通常是给孩子),以满足经济状况调查的资格要求。在本文中,我们量化了这种行为的程度,使用了2005年《赤字削减法案》(Deficit Reduction Act of 2005)引发的对不当亲子转移的惩罚变化。我们根据假设估计差异中的差异模型,即只有具有高水平养老院风险(高风险)的个人会因为该法案而改变转移。我们发现,在两年的时间里,高风险个体将对儿童的转移支付减少了11%,平均转移支付总额减少了4860美元。该结果仅适用于已婚受访者。我们还进行了三重差异分析,以检验金融知识的异质性,发现即使是那些金融知识水平较低的人也会对惩罚做出反应。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Social Security Bulletin
Social Security Bulletin Social Sciences-Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
0.00%
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