{"title":"SoK: Quantifying Cyber Risk","authors":"Daniel W. Woods, Rainer Böhme","doi":"10.1109/SP40001.2021.00053","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces a causal model inspired by structural equation modeling that explains cyber risk outcomes in terms of latent factors measured using reflexive indicators. First, we use the model to classify empirical cyber harm studies. We discover cyber harms are not exceptional in terms of typical or extreme losses. The increasing frequency of data breaches is contested and stock market reactions to cyber incidents are becoming less damaging over time. Focusing on harms alone breeds fatalism; the causal model is most useful in evaluating the effectiveness of security interventions. We show how simple statistical relationships lead to spurious results in which more security spending or applying updates are associated with greater rates of compromise. When accounting for threat and exposure, indicators of security are shown to be important factors in explaining the variance in rates of compromise, especially when the studies use multiple indicators of the security level.","PeriodicalId":6786,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","volume":"131 1","pages":"211-228"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"20","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00053","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 20
Abstract
This paper introduces a causal model inspired by structural equation modeling that explains cyber risk outcomes in terms of latent factors measured using reflexive indicators. First, we use the model to classify empirical cyber harm studies. We discover cyber harms are not exceptional in terms of typical or extreme losses. The increasing frequency of data breaches is contested and stock market reactions to cyber incidents are becoming less damaging over time. Focusing on harms alone breeds fatalism; the causal model is most useful in evaluating the effectiveness of security interventions. We show how simple statistical relationships lead to spurious results in which more security spending or applying updates are associated with greater rates of compromise. When accounting for threat and exposure, indicators of security are shown to be important factors in explaining the variance in rates of compromise, especially when the studies use multiple indicators of the security level.