A Nihilistic View of the Efficient Breach

J. Harrison
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

This article began as a reaction to an article by Daniel Makovits and Alan Schwartz in the Virginia Law Review, “The Myth of the Efficient Breach. . . .” In their article they offer what they call “new defenses” of the expectation interest as a contract remedy. Much of their analysis has been anticipated by others. Plus, in my view the law and economics concepts they seem to rely on lost their legitimacy years ago. Their article was the catalyst for this broader examination of forty years of writing about the efficient breach and an assessment of where it has gotten us. The answer: not far. This article demonstrates that no contract remedy is consistent with efficient breach and, more importantly, that no remedy can be consistent with the efficient breach. Although this offering relies somewhat on new teachings from behavioral economics and happiness studies, it relies primarily on the fact that an efficient breach requires internalization of the harm caused. The harm caused by a breach is not simply difficult to measure but is fluid. Legal scholars who persist in refining the analysis actually get further from a practical solution. The article closes with what may be regarded as some good news. While scholars have written thousands of pages over decades on the issue, the courts have largely ignored those writings.
有效缺口的虚无主义观点
这篇文章最初是对Daniel Makovits和Alan Schwartz在弗吉尼亚法律评论上发表的一篇文章的回应,“有效违约的神话. . . .”在他们的文章中,他们提出了他们所谓的“新防御”,将预期利益作为一种合同救济。他们的大部分分析都在其他人的预料之中。此外,在我看来,他们所依赖的法律和经济概念多年前就失去了合法性。他们的文章促使人们更广泛地审视了四十年来关于有效突破的写作,并评估了它给我们带来了什么。答案是:不远。本文论证了没有合同救济与有效违约相一致,更重要的是,没有救济可以与有效违约相一致。尽管这一提议在一定程度上依赖于行为经济学和幸福研究的新教义,但它主要依赖于这样一个事实:有效的违约需要将所造成的伤害内在化。违约造成的损害不仅难以衡量,而且是不稳定的。坚持完善分析的法律学者实际上离实际解决方案更远。这篇文章的结尾可能被认为是一些好消息。几十年来,学者们就这个问题写了数千页的文章,但法院在很大程度上忽视了这些文章。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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