Group Selection and Reciprocity among Kin

N. Dahanukar, M. Watve
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The question how Darwinian mechanisms lead to the evolution of individually costly cooperative behavior has given rise to a number of hypotheses. However, attempts to build a synthesis where different types of mechanisms coexist and interact at different levels of selections are still scarce. Here we derive simple game theoretical models where the group level conflicts are resolved by group selection while simultaneously within group competition is resolved by kin selection and reciprocity. We show that none of the mechanisms, when alone, is as robust in evolving and maintaining cooperation as a synthesis of all. Furthermore, we show that initially within group conflicts can be overcome only by kin selection and not reciprocity. However, once common, different types of reciprocities can maintain high levels of cooperation even if average relatedness among individuals is lowered, groups become large, and the benefits of cooperation are reduced. Based on the synthesis we also propose a possible route to the evolution of social and eusocial systems.
群体选择与亲缘互惠
达尔文机制是如何导致个体代价高昂的合作行为进化的,这个问题引发了许多假设。然而,试图建立一个不同类型的机制共存并在不同的选择水平上相互作用的综合仍然很少。本文推导了简单的博弈论模型,其中群体层面的冲突通过群体选择来解决,群体内部的竞争通过亲缘选择和互惠来解决。我们表明,在发展和维持合作方面,任何一种机制单独都不如综合所有机制那样强大。此外,我们表明,最初的群体内部冲突只能通过亲缘选择而不是互惠来克服。然而,一旦共同的,不同类型的互惠可以保持高水平的合作,即使个人之间的平均关联度降低,群体变得更大,合作的好处减少。在综合的基础上,我们还提出了社会和社会系统进化的可能途径。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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