{"title":"The Gatekeeper's Dilemma: \"When Should I Transfer This Customer?\"","authors":"Brett A. Hathaway, E. Kagan, M. Dada","doi":"10.1287/opre.2021.2211","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"When Should I Transfer This Customer? “Please hold while I transfer you to next level of support.” Most of us have been on the receiving end of this message. In this study, the authors look at transfers from the service worker’s perspective. They create an online experiment in which participants play the role of call center agents who need to decide whether to transfer a virtual service request or continue attempting to resolve it. Consistent with compensation schemes common in call centers, participants receive a bonus for each successful resolution and may pay a penalty if they transfer. The authors find that these incentives generally work well; however, agents appear to overreact to transfer penalties by handling more requests than they should and transferring too few requests. Although this may be good news for customers who dislike being transferred, such behaviors may be costly for the call center; thus, managers need to be careful when rolling out complex compensation schemes.","PeriodicalId":19546,"journal":{"name":"Oper. Res.","volume":"8 1","pages":"843-859"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Oper. Res.","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2211","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
When Should I Transfer This Customer? “Please hold while I transfer you to next level of support.” Most of us have been on the receiving end of this message. In this study, the authors look at transfers from the service worker’s perspective. They create an online experiment in which participants play the role of call center agents who need to decide whether to transfer a virtual service request or continue attempting to resolve it. Consistent with compensation schemes common in call centers, participants receive a bonus for each successful resolution and may pay a penalty if they transfer. The authors find that these incentives generally work well; however, agents appear to overreact to transfer penalties by handling more requests than they should and transferring too few requests. Although this may be good news for customers who dislike being transferred, such behaviors may be costly for the call center; thus, managers need to be careful when rolling out complex compensation schemes.