Complejidad del intercambio, la dependencia de recursos y la subcontratación a largo plazo de servicios de I+D

Abstract

We analyze the preference of technological firms for long-term relationships, instead of short-term contracts, as they engage in R&D outsourcing agreements with external partners. We draw from transaction cost theory and resource dependence theory to argue that this choice will be mainly determined by the attributes of the R&D service outsourced, and the company's need to secure the availability of external resources on a long-term basis. Using original international survey data on 90 R&D outsourcing agreements by European and U.S. companies operating in technology-intensive industries, we find that long-term relationships are preferred when the attributes of asset-specificity and frequency are present and when the level of resource dependence between the exchange parties increases. On the other hand, companies seem to prefer short-term contracts in order to follow a flexible R&D sourcing strategy. This preference appears to be higher for those companies that are more technologically competent, and when the underlying motive for outsourcing the R&D service is increasing operational flexibility, or overcoming the liability of foreignness when entering new markets.