{"title":"Application of Inherent Dignity to the Abolition with Support Model","authors":"Kay Wilson","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192843258.003.0005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that inherent dignity is more than an abstract concept and must be understood within its social and political context. It applies the concept of inherent dignity in the disability context and to the Abolition with Support model. I argue that dignity is relevant to mental health in two ways. First, it relates to the loss of dignity that persons with mental impairment may experience by reason of their impairment itself and secondly by the way in which persons with mental impairment have historically been treated by the mental health system and society more generally. I consider the meaning of autonomy and the tensions between the concepts of dignity and autonomy. I argue that the meaning of dignity is wider than the legal recognition of autonomy. On a balanced and holistic reading of the CRPD which gives effect to all human rights, dignity may at times be given priority over autonomy, which could provide a human rights justification for limited detention and psychiatric treatment, rather than the abolition of mental health law. Nonetheless, the loss of dignity that is caused by the mental health system must also be addressed and provides a strong basis for significant systemic and legal reform.","PeriodicalId":81815,"journal":{"name":"Law and mental health","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Law and mental health","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192843258.003.0005","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This chapter argues that inherent dignity is more than an abstract concept and must be understood within its social and political context. It applies the concept of inherent dignity in the disability context and to the Abolition with Support model. I argue that dignity is relevant to mental health in two ways. First, it relates to the loss of dignity that persons with mental impairment may experience by reason of their impairment itself and secondly by the way in which persons with mental impairment have historically been treated by the mental health system and society more generally. I consider the meaning of autonomy and the tensions between the concepts of dignity and autonomy. I argue that the meaning of dignity is wider than the legal recognition of autonomy. On a balanced and holistic reading of the CRPD which gives effect to all human rights, dignity may at times be given priority over autonomy, which could provide a human rights justification for limited detention and psychiatric treatment, rather than the abolition of mental health law. Nonetheless, the loss of dignity that is caused by the mental health system must also be addressed and provides a strong basis for significant systemic and legal reform.