Moscow's Position on the Remilitarization of the Rhineland

IF 0.2 Q2 HISTORY
A. O. Naumov
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The article examines the problem of the remilitarization of the Rhineland by Nazi Germany in March 1936 through the prism of the perception of this event in the Soviet military and political-diplomatic circles. Special attention is paid to the analysis of archival materials introduced into scholarly circulation for the first time, allowing a new look at the position of the USSR during the development of crisis trends in the Versailles system of international relations. The author comes to the conclusion that the Rhineland crisis played a crucial role in changing the balance of power in Europe, dramatically strengthening the position of Nazi Germany and weakening the position of France. Great Britain, after the remilitarization of the Rhineland, embarked on the path of appeasing the aggressors. In fact, this event was the starting point of the crisis of the interwar order, which eventually led to the outbreak of World War II. Surrendering one position after another and making concessions to Hitler’s Germany, Great Britain and France were unable to achieve their main goal – to prevent a new world war, only strengthening the confidence of European dictators in the expediency of achieving their goals by force. In these difficult conditions, as archival documents show, there was a clear understanding in Moscow how dangerous the development of destructive events in European politics was. When forming its own foreign policy line, the Kremlin objectively assessed both the true intentions of the Hitler regime and the essence of the foreign policy maneuvers of Western democracies.
莫斯科对莱茵兰重新军事化的立场
本文从苏联军事和政治外交界对1936年3月纳粹德国对莱茵兰重新军事化事件的看法出发,考察了莱茵兰重新军事化的问题。特别注意对首次引入学术流通的档案材料的分析,使人们能够重新审视苏联在凡尔赛国际关系体系危机趋势发展期间的地位。作者得出结论,莱茵兰危机在改变欧洲力量平衡方面发挥了至关重要的作用,它极大地加强了纳粹德国的地位,削弱了法国的地位。在莱茵兰重新军事化之后,大不列颠走上了绥靖侵略者的道路。事实上,这一事件是两次世界大战之间秩序危机的起点,最终导致了第二次世界大战的爆发。英国和法国一个接一个地向希特勒的德国让步,无法实现他们的主要目标——防止新的世界大战,只会增强欧洲独裁者的信心,让他们相信用武力来达到自己的目的是权宜之计。档案文件显示,在这种困难的情况下,莫斯科清楚地认识到,欧洲政治中破坏性事件的发展是多么危险。在形成自己的外交政策路线时,克里姆林宫客观地评估了希特勒政权的真实意图和西方民主国家外交政策运作的本质。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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CiteScore
0.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
20
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