Optimal Cyber-Defense Strategies for Advanced Persistent Threats: A Game Theoretical Analysis

Jeffrey Acquaviva, Mark Mahon, Bruce Einfalt, T. LaPorta
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

We introduce a novel mathematical model that treats network security as a game between cyber attackers and network administrators. The model takes the form of a zero-sum repeated game where each sub-game corresponds to a possible state of the attacker. Our formulation views state as the set of compromised edges in a graph opposed to the more traditional node-based view. This provides a more expressive model since it allows the defender to anticipate the direction of attack. Both players move independently and in continuous time allowing for the possibility of one player moving several times before the other does. This model shows that defense-in-depth is not always a rational strategy for budget constrained network administrators. Furthermore, a defender can dissuade a rational attacker from attempting to attack a network if the defense budget is sufficiently high. This means that a network administrator does not need to make their system completely free of vulnerabilities, they only to ensure the penalties for being caught outweigh the potential rewards gained.
高级持续性威胁的最优网络防御策略:博弈论分析
我们引入了一种新的数学模型,将网络安全视为网络攻击者和网络管理员之间的博弈。该模型采用零和重复博弈的形式,其中每个子博弈对应于攻击者的一种可能状态。我们的公式将状态视为图中妥协边的集合,而不是更传统的基于节点的视图。这提供了一个更具表现力的模型,因为它允许防守者预测攻击方向。两个玩家在连续的时间内独立移动,允许一个玩家在另一个玩家之前移动几次。该模型表明,对于预算有限的网络管理员来说,纵深防御并不总是一个合理的策略。此外,如果防御预算足够高,防御者可以阻止理性的攻击者尝试攻击网络。这意味着网络管理员不需要使他们的系统完全没有漏洞,他们只需要确保被发现的惩罚大于获得的潜在奖励。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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