CEO Turnover and Compensation: An Empirical Investigation

IF 0.9 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Quarterly Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2014-11-04 DOI:10.1142/S2010139214500086

Rachel Graefe-Anderson

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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Because CEO turnover events provide the board of directors with a unique opportunity to potentially completely restructure CEO compensation packages, changes to CEO compensation following a turnover event could prove to inform the ongoing debate regarding CEO compensation. This paper investigates what happens to CEO compensation when a turnover event occurs. Specifically, I examine CEO compensation levels and pay-performance sensitivity for incoming and outgoing CEOs involved in turnover events at public companies in the United States. My main findings are as follows: (1) incoming CEOs are paid as much as or more than those they replace, (2) outsider replacements are paid more than their predecessors even after controlling for education and skills, and (3) CEOs who are forced out are not paid differently from those who replace them, while CEOs who leave voluntarily are paid significantly less than their replacements. Further analysis reveals that proxies for managerial power including CEO tenure, CEO centrality, founder status, and high CEO ownership cannot explain these results. Overall, these findings are difficult to reconcile with the view that managerial power is the primary determinant of CEO compensation.

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CEO离职与薪酬:一个实证研究

由于CEO离职事件为董事会提供了一个独特的机会，有可能彻底重组CEO薪酬方案，因此，在CEO离职事件后，CEO薪酬的变化可能会为正在进行的关于CEO薪酬的辩论提供信息。本文研究了发生离职事件时CEO薪酬的变化。具体而言，我研究了美国上市公司中涉及人事变动事件的新任和离任首席执行官的薪酬水平和薪酬绩效敏感性。我的主要发现如下:(1)新任ceo的薪酬与被接替者相当，甚至更高;(2)即使在控制了教育和技能因素后，外部接替者的薪酬也高于前任;(3)被迫离职的ceo与接替者的薪酬没有差异，而自愿离职的ceo的薪酬明显低于接替者。进一步的分析表明，包括CEO任期、CEO中心性、创始人地位和高CEO所有权在内的管理权力代理不能解释这些结果。总的来说，这些发现很难与管理权力是CEO薪酬的主要决定因素的观点相一致。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Quarterly Journal of Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

1.10

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Quarterly Journal of Finance publishes high-quality papers in all areas of finance, including corporate finance, asset pricing, financial econometrics, international finance, macro-finance, behavioral finance, banking and financial intermediation, capital markets, risk management and insurance, derivatives, quantitative finance, corporate governance and compensation, investments and entrepreneurial finance.