Comment: Evolutionary Theories of Common Law Efficiency: Reasons for (Cognitive) Skepticism

A. Hirsch
{"title":"Comment: Evolutionary Theories of Common Law Efficiency: Reasons for (Cognitive) Skepticism","authors":"A. Hirsch","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.600041","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This comment critically examines evolutionary models of the common law in the light of behavioral theory. To the extent that the common law assumes the characteristics that judges strive to impart upon it, their efforts are doomed to succeed imperfectly, as a consequence of judges' bounded rationality. On the other hand, several different but related models of common law dynamics posit that judge-made law tends ineluctably in the direction of economic efficiency as a consequence of blind, evolutionary mechanisms operating independently of judges' predilections. Hence, evolutionary models suggest the possibility that over time, the process of lawmaking can transcend the bounded rationality of lawmakers and achieve a degree of efficiency that advertent efforts of design could not. Nevertheless, this comment concludes that evolutionary models of common law dynamics offer no escape from the bottleneck of bounded rationality. Although the states of minds of judges are irrelevant to those models, they depend instead upon the assumption that other participants in the judicial process - litigants and their attorneys - are rational decision-makers. When we assume instead that litigants and attorneys are susceptible to the same cognitive frailties that human beings generally share, the models break down, or at least become adulterated by noise that weakens the evolutionary pressures that they hypothesize. The difficulties with those models do not disappear even when we relax the assumption that the common-law system within which rules are formulated is fixed in its present structure. A historical alternative to the current structure that one scholar has hypothesized to have been particularly productive of efficient rules is in fact degraded by the same cognitive frailties. Nor can we predict that meta-evolutionary processes of competition between legal systems will lead the principles of jurisprudence in the direction of a system most likely to generate efficient rules.","PeriodicalId":81266,"journal":{"name":"Florida State University law review. Florida State University. College of Law","volume":"23 1","pages":"6"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2004-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"12","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Florida State University law review. Florida State University. College of Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.600041","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12

Abstract

This comment critically examines evolutionary models of the common law in the light of behavioral theory. To the extent that the common law assumes the characteristics that judges strive to impart upon it, their efforts are doomed to succeed imperfectly, as a consequence of judges' bounded rationality. On the other hand, several different but related models of common law dynamics posit that judge-made law tends ineluctably in the direction of economic efficiency as a consequence of blind, evolutionary mechanisms operating independently of judges' predilections. Hence, evolutionary models suggest the possibility that over time, the process of lawmaking can transcend the bounded rationality of lawmakers and achieve a degree of efficiency that advertent efforts of design could not. Nevertheless, this comment concludes that evolutionary models of common law dynamics offer no escape from the bottleneck of bounded rationality. Although the states of minds of judges are irrelevant to those models, they depend instead upon the assumption that other participants in the judicial process - litigants and their attorneys - are rational decision-makers. When we assume instead that litigants and attorneys are susceptible to the same cognitive frailties that human beings generally share, the models break down, or at least become adulterated by noise that weakens the evolutionary pressures that they hypothesize. The difficulties with those models do not disappear even when we relax the assumption that the common-law system within which rules are formulated is fixed in its present structure. A historical alternative to the current structure that one scholar has hypothesized to have been particularly productive of efficient rules is in fact degraded by the same cognitive frailties. Nor can we predict that meta-evolutionary processes of competition between legal systems will lead the principles of jurisprudence in the direction of a system most likely to generate efficient rules.
评论:普通法效率的进化理论:(认知)怀疑论的原因
这篇评论从行为理论的角度批判性地考察了普通法的进化模型。在某种程度上,普通法假定了法官努力赋予它的特征,他们的努力注定不会完美地成功,这是法官有限理性的结果。另一方面,一些不同但相关的普通法动力学模型认为,法官制定的法律不可避免地会朝着经济效率的方向发展,这是独立于法官偏好的盲目进化机制的结果。因此,进化模型表明,随着时间的推移,立法过程可以超越立法者的有限理性,并达到某种程度的效率,这是有意的设计努力所不能达到的。然而,这一评论的结论是,普通法动力学的进化模型无法摆脱有限理性的瓶颈。尽管法官的心理状态与这些模型无关,但它们依赖于司法程序的其他参与者——诉讼当事人及其律师——是理性决策者的假设。当我们转而假设诉讼当事人和律师容易受到人类普遍共有的认知弱点的影响时,模型就会崩溃,或者至少被噪音所掺和,这些噪音削弱了他们假设的进化压力。即使我们放宽制定规则的普通法制度在其现有结构中是固定不变的假设,这些模式的困难也不会消失。一位学者假设,当前结构的一个历史替代方案特别能产生有效的规则,但事实上,它也因同样的认知缺陷而退化。我们也无法预测,法律体系之间竞争的元进化过程将把法理学原则引向最有可能产生有效规则的体系。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信
小红书