Do audit committees manage legitimacy through increased voluntary reporting? Evidence from a large-scale textual analysis of audit committee reports

Michelle A. Draeger, Bradley P. Lawson, Jaime J. Schmidt
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

This study investigates whether audit committees manage legitimacy by voluntarily disclosing their financial reporting and audit oversight activities in the audit committee report. The answer is important because, if true, it would suggest that a regulatory mandate to require expanded audit committee reports may not be necessary. Performing a large-scale textual analysis of over 24,000 U.S. companies’ audit committee report disclosures issued between 2006 and 2017, we find that audit committees of large accelerated filers (LAFs) voluntarily increase disclosure of their financial reporting and audit oversight activities following (1) the SEC’s 2015 Concept Release which encouraged greater audit committee disclosure and (2) a company’s announced need to restate its financial statements. However, we do not find a similar increase following either event for non-large accelerated filers. Our findings indicate that large companies respond to external demand for additional audit committee disclosure but that a regulatory mandate may improve small company audit committee reporting.
审计委员会是否通过增加自愿报告来管理合法性?证据来自对审计委员会报告的大规模文本分析
本研究考察审计委员会是否通过在审计委员会报告中自愿披露其财务报告和审计监督活动来管理合法性。这个问题的答案很重要,因为如果是真的,它将表明,要求扩大审计委员会报告的监管授权可能没有必要。对2006年至2017年间发布的24,000多家美国公司审计委员会报告披露进行了大规模文本分析,我们发现大型加速申报公司(LAFs)的审计委员会在以下情况下自愿增加其财务报告和审计监督活动的披露:(1)美国证券交易委员会2015年概念发布鼓励更多审计委员会披露;(2)公司宣布需要重述其财务报表。然而,对于非大型加速过滤器,我们没有发现在这两个事件之后出现类似的增长。我们的研究结果表明,大公司对审计委员会额外披露的外部需求做出了回应,但监管要求可能会改善小公司审计委员会的报告。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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