Demand Information Sharing in the Presence of B2B Spot Market

Shanshan Ma, Liyan Wang
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Companies have started to use a business-to-business (B2B) spot market in combination with their traditional long-term procurement contracts to procure intermediate goods. This study investigates whether or not the market players should share their demand forecast information with one another in a supplier — manufacturer supply chain and assess the benefits of sharing information in the presence of the B2B spot market. First, the supplier and manufacturer make forecast on the demand, and during this period they select an information-sharing arrangement, that is, whether to share information or not. Then, the supplier sets the wholesale price and the manufacturer submits an order after observing the wholesale price. Both the supplier and manufacturer can trade their intermediate goods in a B2B spot market. We find that the manufacturer can infer the supplier’s demand forecast from the wholesale price in the non-information-sharing case, but the supplier cannot enjoy such an advantage. We also find that information sharing benefits both the supplier and the manufacturer, if and only if demand and spot price are positively correlated and the supplier’s expectation of the manufacturer’s forecast is medium. By contrast, obtaining more demand forecast information can hurt supply chain players. Information sharing benefits the manufacturer but hurts the supplier when the supplier’s expectation of the manufacturer’s forecast is high. However, when the supplier’s expectation of the manufacturer’s forecast is low, information sharing benefits the supplier but hurts the manufacturer.
B2B现货市场下的需求信息共享
企业已经开始利用企业对企业(B2B)现货市场,结合传统的长期采购合同来采购中间产品。本研究探讨在供应商-制造商的供应链中,市场参与者是否应该彼此分享他们的需求预测信息,并评估在B2B现货市场存在的情况下共享信息的好处。首先,供应商和制造商对需求进行预测,并在此期间选择信息共享安排,即是否共享信息。然后,供应商设定批发价格,制造商在观察批发价格后提交订单。供应商和制造商都可以在B2B现货市场上交易他们的中间产品。我们发现,在非信息共享情况下,制造商可以从批发价格中推断出供应商的需求预测,但供应商不能享有这种优势。我们还发现,当且仅当需求和现货价格呈正相关且供应商对制造商预测的期望为中等时,信息共享对供应商和制造商都有利。相比之下,获得更多的需求预测信息可能会损害供应链参与者。当供应商对制造商预测的期望过高时,信息共享对制造商有利,但对供应商不利。然而,当供应商对制造商预测的期望较低时,信息共享对供应商有利,但对制造商不利。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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