Pricing and Compatibility in Network Goods Markets

T. Athanasopoulos
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Abstract

I examine an incumbent monopolist's pricing strategy in a two-period durable goods market for complements, such as the Operating System and software applications, and its compatibility stance with a future competitor when the market for applications is characterised by direct network effects and quality growth as well as potential switching costs. Consumers arrive in the market in the first period and the “threat” to exercise their option to postpone their purchase may lead the incumbent to charge a price for its Operating System that is lower than that of a static monopolist no matter what the compatibility regime. I also show that the incumbent may support compatibility regardless of the presence of switching costs. The welfare effects of mandatory compatibility are ambiguous.
网络商品市场的定价与兼容性
我研究了在位垄断者在两期耐用品市场的定价策略,以补充产品,如操作系统和软件应用程序,以及当应用程序市场以直接网络效应和质量增长以及潜在转换成本为特征时,其与未来竞争对手的兼容性立场。消费者在第一阶段进入市场,而“威胁”行使他们推迟购买的选择权,可能导致在位者对其操作系统收取的价格低于静态垄断者的价格,无论兼容机制是什么。我还说明,无论是否存在转换成本,现有系统都可以支持兼容性。强制兼容性的福利效应是模糊的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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