Obituário do teto de gastos da EC nº 95/2016: erros, acertos e aprendizados

Abstract

The article deals with the Brazilian experience with a constitutional spending cap, introduced into the country’s Constitution by the Constitutional Amendment n. 95/2016 and in the process of being overcome. To this end, it assays the rule’s design and the option for its introduction into the Constitution, in view of foreign experiences and the correlated literature. It contrasts the different (and polarized) expectations in relation to the rule and the outcomes correlated to it, under fiscal, political-legislative (and budgetary) and juridical aspects. The article advocates the practical limitation of the strategy of excessively restricting, through a constitutional norm, the space for political choice in fiscal matters and exams the succession of constitutional amendments, eminently aimed at circumventing the rule, and the consequent weakening of the expected stability of a rigid constitutional document. It also indicates a clear option for constitutional reforms, in the political field, to the detriment of jurisdictional solutions within the stablished framework.