Prime numbers and the evolution of cooperation, II: Advantages to cooperators using prime-number period lengths in a finite population constrained to prisoner's dilemma strategies that alternate between periods of activity and inactivity

Q1 Mathematics
Tim Johnson
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

This paper presents a model of a finite population of agents constrained to strategies that alternate between activity and inactivity (a.k.a. temporal partitioning) in a social environment where multiple one-shot prisoner's dilemma games occur across discrete, intra-generational time points. Evolutionary selection acts on agents’ behavioral dispositions to cooperate/defect and the schedules that determine when agents periodically implement that behavior. Numerical simulation of the model indicates that cooperators reach fixation with far greater frequency when using schedules with prime-number period lengths. These findings reinforce recent analytic findings that indicate a connection between the evolution of cooperation and the prime numbers, plus they offer new empirical predictions about the timing of social behavior.

素数与合作的演化,II:在有限种群中使用素数周期长度的合作者的优势,受制于在活动和不活动之间交替进行的囚徒困境策略
本文提出了一个模型,在一个社会环境中,多个单次囚徒困境博弈发生在离散的、代内的时间点上,在这种环境中,有限种群的代理受限于在活动和不活动之间交替的策略(也称为时间划分)。进化选择作用于代理的合作/缺陷行为倾向,以及决定代理何时周期性地执行该行为的时间表。模型的数值模拟表明,当使用素数周期时,合作伙伴达到固定的频率要高得多。这些发现强化了最近的分析发现,即合作的进化与素数之间存在联系,此外,它们还提供了关于社会行为发生时间的新的实证预测。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Chaos, Solitons and Fractals: X
Chaos, Solitons and Fractals: X Mathematics-Mathematics (all)
CiteScore
5.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
15
审稿时长
20 weeks
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