'Why Johnny Can't Regulate': A Reply to Ergas

IF 0.1
D. Biggar
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Abstract

Henry Ergas is a talented, erudite and articulate economist, and a long-time critic of the ACCC/AER. In a recent paper in this journal2 he raises the possibility that public utility regulation is doomed to end in failure. He draws on the vignette of primary-schooler Johnny, who wants to grow up to be a regulator. Is Johnny's career destined to end up with nothing but disappointment?Of course, this raises the question as to what public utility regulation is designed to achieve. Ergas addresses this issue at the outset, by allowing that, due to transactions costs, a Coasean bargain contract between the customers and a monopoly supplier would be subject to the risk of ex-post opportunism - both on the side of the supplier (who might threaten to shade quality or raise the price ex-post) and on the side of the customers (who might seek to expropriate the sunk investment of the supplier by collectively agreeing to lower the price to the supplier). Given these risks, either side may fail to make valuable sunk investments, or, as Ergas puts it, either side may make investments which are inefficient due to the threat of opportunism: 'each side would invest in costly precautions so as to ward them off. But ... those investments, seen from a societal perspective, are merely a waste, reducing welfare."3Ergas is thereby led to ask: can the government directly step in to re-create the Coasean bargain on behalf of small customers? He rightly points out many problems in this, including problems of aggregating customer preferences, problems of monitoring and enforcing by customers of the government in its interactions with the supplier, and problems of time-inconsistency and opportunism.Perhaps these problems can be resolved by delegating certain powers to an independent authority. Such delegation might make it easier for customers to monitor, might improve the information-collection ability, and might resolve the commitment problems. After all, delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank as a means of overcoming the time-inconsistency problem has been a success. Might not the same principle apply to an independent regulatory authority? Ergas goes to some lengths to distinguish the role of a central bank from the role of an independent regulator. According to Ergas, an economic regulator is likely to have much wider range of instruments at its disposal and more vaguely specified objectives. Moreover, the incentives for time- inconsistency are much stronger for a regulator than for a central bank. He also suggests that newly established central banks seek to invest in a reputation for being tough on inflation, whereas newly established regulators seem to do the opposite:This [need to establish a reputation] would suggest that the initial period following the transition to regulatory independence would be associated with regulator's credibly signalling a strong aversion to expropriating sunk investments. But in no major country has that been the case ... If anything, utility regulators seemed to preference delivering price reductions to consumers, as evidenced by tough price caps and steep falls in regulated revenues.4As an aside, we may note that any tendency for new regulators to favour customers is still consistent with the regulator seeking to establish a reputation for protecting sunk investments - but with rather more focus on the sunk investments of the customers. If the primary reason why the regulator is established in the first place is a concern that - in the absence of the intervention of the regulator - the customers will be unwilling to make sunk investments for fear of expropriation by the monopoly supplier,5 it makes sense for a regulator to counter that fear, proving its mettle by being tough on the monopoly supplier. Such actions may improve the climate for investment by those customers who need to invest in reliance on the monopoly service.'Last but not least', Ergas expresses concern that regulatory decisions are affected by the wider political context, citing as examples changes to the merits review process in electricity and ministerial powers of discretion in NBN. …
“为什么约翰尼不能调节”:对厄格斯的回复
亨利·厄加斯是一位才华横溢、博学多才、能言善辩的经济学家,也是ACCC/AER的长期批评者。在本刊最近发表的一篇论文中,他提出了公用事业监管注定以失败告终的可能性。他画了小学生约翰尼的小插图,约翰尼想长大后成为一名监管者。约翰尼的事业是否注定要以失望告终?当然,这就提出了一个问题:公共事业监管的目的是什么?Ergas一开始就解决了这个问题,通过允许,由于交易成本,Coasean交易合同和客户之间的垄断供应商将受到事后机会主义的风险——的供应商(谁可能威胁阴影质量或提高价格事后)的客户(可能试图没收沉没投资集体同意降低价格的供应商供应商)。考虑到这些风险,任何一方都可能无法进行有价值的沉没投资,或者,正如厄尔加斯所说,由于机会主义的威胁,任何一方都可能进行效率低下的投资:“每一方都将投资于昂贵的预防措施,以避免这些风险。”但是…从社会的角度来看,这些投资只是一种浪费,减少了福利。因此,人们不禁要问:政府能否直接介入,代表小客户重新创造科斯恩的交易?他正确地指出了其中的许多问题,包括消费者偏好的聚合问题、消费者对政府与供应商互动过程中的监督和执行问题、时间不一致和机会主义问题。也许这些问题可以通过将某些权力下放给一个独立的机构来解决。这种委托可能使客户更容易进行监控,可能提高信息收集能力,并可能解决承诺问题。毕竟,将货币政策委托给独立的中央银行,作为克服时间不一致问题的一种手段,是成功的。难道同样的原则不适用于独立的监管机构吗?埃尔加斯煞费苦心地将央行的角色与独立监管机构的角色区分开来。根据埃尔加斯的说法,经济监管机构可能有更广泛的工具可供使用,目标也更模糊。此外,对于监管机构而言,时间不一致的动机要比央行强得多。他还表示,新成立的央行寻求投资于对通胀采取强硬态度的声誉,而新成立的监管机构似乎恰恰相反:这(建立声誉的需要)表明,在向监管独立过渡后的最初阶段,监管机构将可信地发出强烈厌恶征用沉没投资的信号。但在任何主要国家都没有出现这种情况……如果说有什么不同的话,那就是公用事业监管机构似乎更倾向于向消费者降价,严格的价格上限和受监管收入的大幅下降就证明了这一点。作为题外话,我们可能会注意到,新监管机构偏袒客户的任何倾向,仍然与监管机构寻求建立保护沉没投资的声誉是一致的——但更关注客户的沉没投资。如果设立监管机构的首要原因是担心——在监管机构不干预的情况下——客户会因为担心被垄断供应商征用而不愿进行沉没投资,那么监管机构消除这种担忧,通过对垄断供应商采取强硬措施来证明自己的勇气,是有道理的。这些行动可能会改善那些需要投资依赖垄断服务的客户的投资环境。“最后但并非最不重要的”,Ergas表达了对监管决定受到更广泛的政治背景影响的担忧,他引用了电力方面的优点审查过程的变化和NBN方面的部长自由裁量权的例子。…
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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