Long-Term Contract Design for Traffic Off-Loading in Heterogeneous Cloud Radio Access Networks

Min Wang, Biling Zhang, Jung-Lang Yu, Zhu Han
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

In order to improve the energy efficiency of the heterogeneous cloud radio access networks (H-CRANs), it is a promising approach to shutting off the small base stations (SBSs) with low traffic load and offload the traffic to the active SBSs nearby. Due to the selfish nature of the SBSs, the nearby SBSs may not cooperate if there is not appropriate incentive. On the other hand, since a user will be served by a SBS for a period of time, during which the SBS's offloading ability, i.e., its own traffic load and the offloading channel conditions, may vary dramatically. In such a case, how to provide proper long-term incentives for the potential SBSs to take over the traffic is an essential issue, especially when these SBSs belong to different service providers. Considering the SBS's offloading ability is the privat information that is unknown to the shutting off SBS, in this paper, the SBSs' cooperation stimulation problem is formulated as a long-term contract design problem, where the shutting off SBS acts as the principal and the offloading SBSs are the agents. A contract-theoretic framework based on the Markov decision process is formulated to study the long-term utilities of both parties. Through theoretical analysis, the feasible conditions for the optimal solution are described. Finally, the optimal contract is obtained through the proposed algorithm, and simulation results validate the effectiveness of our proposed long-term contract-based incentive mechanism for traffic offloading in H-CRANs.
异构云无线接入网业务分流的长期合同设计
为了提高异构云无线接入网(H-CRANs)的能源效率,关闭低业务量负荷的小型基站(SBSs),将业务量分流给附近的活跃sbans是一种很有前途的方法。由于SBSs的自私性,如果没有适当的激励,附近的SBSs可能不会合作。另一方面,由于用户将在一段时间内由SBS提供服务,在此期间SBS的卸载能力(即其自身的流量负载和卸载通道条件)可能会发生巨大变化。在这种情况下,如何提供适当的长期激励,让潜在的SBSs接管流量,是一个重要的问题,特别是当这些SBSs属于不同的服务提供商时。考虑到SBS的卸载能力是关闭SBS所不知道的私有信息,本文将SBS的合作激励问题表述为一个长期契约设计问题,其中关闭SBS作为委托人,卸载SBS作为代理人。建立了一个基于马尔可夫决策过程的契约理论框架来研究双方的长期效用。通过理论分析,描述了最优解的可行条件。最后,通过所提算法得到了最优契约,仿真结果验证了所提基于长期契约的H-CRANs流量分流激励机制的有效性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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