A physical overlay framework for insider threat mitigation of power system devices

David Formby, Sangjoon Jung, Seth Walters, R. Beyah
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引用次数: 8

Abstract

Nearly every aspect of modern life today, from businesses, transportation, and healthcare, depends on the power grid operating safely and reliably. While the recent push for a “Smart Grid” has shown promise for increased efficiency, security has often been an after-thought, leaving this critical infrastructure vulnerable to a variety of cyber attacks. For instance, devices crucial to the safe operation of the power grid are left in remote substations with their configuration interfaces completely open, providing a vector for outsiders as well as insiders to launch an attack. This paper develops the framework for an overlay network of gateway devices that provide authenticated access control and security monitoring for these vulnerable interfaces. We develop a working prototype of such a device and simulate the performance of deployment throughout a substation. Our results suggest that such a system can be deployed with negligible impact on normal operations, while providing important security mechanisms. By doing so, we demonstrate that our proposal is a practical and efficient solution for retro-fitting security onto crucial power system devices.
缓解电力系统设备内部威胁的物理覆盖框架
从商业、交通到医疗保健,现代生活的几乎每个方面都依赖于电网的安全可靠运行。虽然最近对“智能电网”的推动显示出提高效率的希望,但安全问题往往是事后才想到的,这使得这一关键基础设施容易受到各种网络攻击。例如,对电网安全运行至关重要的设备被留在远程变电站,其配置接口完全开放,为外部人员和内部人员提供了发动攻击的载体。本文开发了一个网关设备覆盖网络框架,为这些易受攻击的接口提供认证访问控制和安全监控。我们开发了这种装置的工作原型,并模拟了整个变电站的部署性能。我们的研究结果表明,这样的系统可以在提供重要安全机制的同时,对正常操作的影响可以忽略不计。通过这样做,我们证明了我们的建议是一个实用而有效的解决方案,可以在关键的电力系统设备上安装安全装置。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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