Should theology take evolutionary ethics seriously? A conversation with Hannah Arendt and Maxine Sheets-Johnstone

Wentzel van Huyssteen
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

In this essay I attempt to bridge the gap between evolutionary and theological meta-narratives by making a proposal for a bottom-up, contextual form of evolutionary ethics, and then specifically ask how this might apply to the evolution of morality, to ethical judgments, and the status of ethical judgments and moral codes in theology. Most importantly, this will imply a christian ethics, and a notion of morality that proceed not from a consideration of rules, duties, rights, moral judgments, moral status, but proceeds rather, from the examination of the fundamental evolutionary realities of human nature. This argument is developed against the background of an analysis of Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s engagement with the work of Hannah Arendt on the notion of evil. Finally I argue that the work of evolutionary ethicists are of great importance for theologians because of their direct interest in how the evolutionary origins of human behaviour is to be explained, and in which way our behaviour has been constrained, but not determined, by biological factors. Evolution by natural selection can explain our tendency to think in normative terms, i.e., our innate sense of moral awareness. However, evolutionary explanations of this moral awareness cannot explain our moral judgments, nor justify the truth claims of any of our moral judgments. Why and how we make moral judgments can only be explained on the level of cultural evolution, and by taking into account the historical embeddedness of our moral codes in religious and political conventions. For Christian Theology the choice will not be between a moral vision that is inherent in revelation and is, therefore, ‘received’ and not invented or constructed. Instead, on a post-Foundational view our moral codes and ethical convictions of what is ‘received’ is itself an interpretative enterprise, shaped experientially through our embeddedness in communities and cultures.
神学应该认真对待进化论伦理吗?与汉娜·阿伦特和玛克辛·希茨-约翰斯通的对话
在这篇文章中,我试图通过提出一种自下而上的、背景形式的进化伦理学来弥合进化论和神学元叙事之间的差距,然后具体地问这如何适用于道德的进化,伦理判断,以及伦理判断和道德规范在神学中的地位。最重要的是,这将意味着一种基督教伦理,以及一种道德观念,这种道德观念不是从对规则、义务、权利、道德判断、道德地位的考虑出发,而是从对人性基本进化现实的考察出发。这一论点是在分析玛克辛·希茨-约翰斯通参与汉娜·阿伦特关于邪恶概念的作品的背景下发展起来的。最后,我认为进化伦理学家的工作对神学家来说非常重要,因为他们对如何解释人类行为的进化起源,以及我们的行为以何种方式受到生物因素的约束而不是决定,有直接的兴趣。自然选择的进化可以解释我们以规范的方式思考的倾向,即我们天生的道德意识。然而,这种道德意识的进化论解释不能解释我们的道德判断,也不能证明我们任何道德判断的真实性。我们为什么以及如何做出道德判断,只能在文化进化的层面上解释,并考虑到我们的道德准则在宗教和政治惯例中的历史嵌入性。对于基督教神学来说,选择不是在一种道德观念之间,这种道德观念是在启示中固有的,因此是“接受的”,而不是发明或构建的。相反,在后基础观点看来,我们的道德准则和“接受”的伦理信念本身就是一种解释性的事业,通过我们在社区和文化中的嵌入性来形成经验。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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