Efficient Penalty Clauses with Debiasing: Lessons from Cognitive Psychology.

Enrico Baffi
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

This paper builds upon the findings of cognitive psychology to revisit the prescriptive solutions proposed in the legal literature with respect to efficient penalty clauses. While refraining from generalizations regarding human behaviour, generalizations that might lead to positions quite removed from reality and in part ideological, as was the case with rational choice theory, the paper instead seeks to distinguish one situation from another in order to identify the existence of decision debiasing mechanisms capable of justifying - in the case of the set of rules in question - hypotheses in which lesser control over the penalty clause would be justified by both Common law and Civil law systems. It may be of interest that this paper makes use of cognitive psychology to expand rather than to restrict contractual freedom. Particular attention was paid to the decisions taken within a firm, in consideration of its hierarchical organization. In this case, the importance of the paper lies in the fact that, whereas psychologists have often underscored the overoptimism of entrepreneurs, these same authors have often demonstrated that there are mechanisms in hierarchical organizations that increase risk aversion. This paper notes that these mechanisms also have an ability to debias decisions. More specifically, the paper emphasizes the importance of the pressure of accountability , personal responsibility, and the outside view of the problem. These three phenomena that characterize the hierarchical organization push it towards choices that are less corrupted by the biases of overoptimism, overconfidence, and illusion of control. It is worth noting that no blanket statement can be made for all firms, because in corporations managers answer to the board of directors, whereas this is not the case with the individual businessman. Finally, it is worth noting that application of cognitive psychology without resorting to generalizations undoubtedly leads, aside from the case in question, to a more moderate paternalism than that supported by some scholars.
具有去偏见的有效惩罚条款:来自认知心理学的教训。
本文以认知心理学的发现为基础,重新审视法律文献中关于有效刑罚条款的规范性解决方案。在避免对人类行为进行概括的同时,这种概括可能会导致完全脱离现实的立场,而且部分是意识形态的立场,就像理性选择理论的情况一样,相反,本文试图将一种情况与另一种情况区分开来,以便确定是否存在能够证明(就所讨论的一套规则而言)对惩罚条款的较小控制在英美法系和大陆法系都是合理的假设的决定去偏见机制。值得注意的是,本文利用认知心理学来扩展而不是限制契约自由。考虑到公司的等级组织,特别注意在公司内部作出的决定。在这种情况下,这篇论文的重要性在于,尽管心理学家经常强调企业家的过度乐观,但这些作者经常证明,在等级组织中存在增加风险厌恶的机制。本文指出,这些机制也具有消除决策偏见的能力。更具体地说,这篇论文强调了问责压力、个人责任和问题的外部观点的重要性。这三种现象是等级制组织的特征,它们促使它做出选择,而这些选择较少受到过度乐观、过度自信和控制幻觉等偏见的影响。值得注意的是,不可能对所有公司都作出笼统的说明,因为在公司中,经理要对董事会负责,而对于个体商人则不是这样。最后,值得注意的是,除了上述案例之外,应用认知心理学而不诉诸概括无疑会导致一种比一些学者所支持的更为温和的家长作风。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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