Piotr Staszkiewicz, Sylwia Morawska, P. Banasik, B. Witkowski, Richard Staszkiewicz
{"title":"Do Judges’ Delegations Affect Judicial Performance? A Transition Economy Evidence","authors":"Piotr Staszkiewicz, Sylwia Morawska, P. Banasik, B. Witkowski, Richard Staszkiewicz","doi":"10.1080/0098261X.2020.1843092","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The aim of this study is to discern whether, by delegating judges from the court to the Ministry of Justice, the Minister of Justice influences the results of courts in terms of adjudication. The study used a unique set of data for the Polish judicial system over a period of five years. The research results indicate that there are three reasons for delegating judges. Firstly, the delegation system serves to fill staff shortages among administrative staff at the Ministry of Justice. Secondly, the delegation system allows for inefficient judges to be moved. Thirdly, the system serves as an indirect control mechanism affecting the independence of courts. The results show that delegation has a positive short-term impact on judicial performance.","PeriodicalId":45509,"journal":{"name":"Justice System Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2020-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Justice System Journal","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0098261X.2020.1843092","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
Abstract The aim of this study is to discern whether, by delegating judges from the court to the Ministry of Justice, the Minister of Justice influences the results of courts in terms of adjudication. The study used a unique set of data for the Polish judicial system over a period of five years. The research results indicate that there are three reasons for delegating judges. Firstly, the delegation system serves to fill staff shortages among administrative staff at the Ministry of Justice. Secondly, the delegation system allows for inefficient judges to be moved. Thirdly, the system serves as an indirect control mechanism affecting the independence of courts. The results show that delegation has a positive short-term impact on judicial performance.
期刊介绍:
The Justice System Journal is an interdisciplinary journal that publishes original research articles on all aspects of law, courts, court administration, judicial behavior, and the impact of all of these on public and social policy. Open as to methodological approaches, The Justice System Journal aims to use the latest in advanced social science research and analysis to bridge the gap between practicing and academic law, courts and politics communities. The Justice System Journal invites submission of original articles and research notes that are likely to be of interest to scholars and practitioners in the field of law, courts, and judicial administration, broadly defined. Articles may draw on a variety of research approaches in the social sciences. The journal does not publish articles devoted to extended analysis of legal doctrine such as a law review might publish, although short manuscripts analyzing cases or legal issues are welcome and will be considered for the Legal Notes section. The Justice System Journal was created in 1974 by the Institute for Court Management and is published under the auspices of the National Center for State Courts. The Justice System Journal features peer-reviewed research articles as well as reviews of important books in law and courts, and analytical research notes on some of the leading cases from state and federal courts. The journal periodically produces special issues that provide analysis of fundamental and timely issues on law and courts from both national and international perspectives.