{"title":"How could relativity be anything other than physical?","authors":"Wayne C. Myrvold","doi":"10.1016/j.shpsb.2017.05.007","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Harvey Brown's <em>Physical Relativity</em> defends a view about the nature of spacetime, which he calls the <em>dynamical perspective</em>, that goes beyond the familiar dichotomy of substantivalist/relationist views. A full defense of this view requires attention to the way that our use of spacetime concepts connect with the physical world. Reflection on such matters, I argue, reveals that the dynamical perspective affords the only possible view about the ontological status of spacetime, in that putative rivals fail to express anything, either true or false. I conclude with remarks aimed at clarifying what is and isn't in dispute with regards to the explanatory priority of spacetime and dynamics, at countering an objection raised by John Norton to views of this sort, and at clarifying the relation between background and effective spacetime structure.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":54442,"journal":{"name":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics","volume":"67 ","pages":"Pages 137-143"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.shpsb.2017.05.007","citationCount":"21","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1355219817300825","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 21
Abstract
Harvey Brown's Physical Relativity defends a view about the nature of spacetime, which he calls the dynamical perspective, that goes beyond the familiar dichotomy of substantivalist/relationist views. A full defense of this view requires attention to the way that our use of spacetime concepts connect with the physical world. Reflection on such matters, I argue, reveals that the dynamical perspective affords the only possible view about the ontological status of spacetime, in that putative rivals fail to express anything, either true or false. I conclude with remarks aimed at clarifying what is and isn't in dispute with regards to the explanatory priority of spacetime and dynamics, at countering an objection raised by John Norton to views of this sort, and at clarifying the relation between background and effective spacetime structure.
期刊介绍:
Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics is devoted to all aspects of the history and philosophy of modern physics broadly understood, including physical aspects of astronomy, chemistry and other non-biological sciences. The primary focus is on physics from the mid/late-nineteenth century to the present, the period of emergence of the kind of theoretical physics that has come to dominate the exact sciences in the twentieth century. The journal is internationally oriented with contributions from a wide range of perspectives. In addition to purely historical or philosophical papers, the editors particularly encourage papers that combine these two disciplines.
The editors are also keen to publish papers of interest to physicists, as well as specialists in history and philosophy of physics.