The Ethics of Monadic Identity in Leibniz's Thought

Abstract

The system of pre-established harmony proposed by Leibnizian ontology gives perspective to a Universe thought of as a perfect machine, or as a "perfect kingdom, governed by an absolute Prince". In this „best of all possible worlds”, the occurrence of evil requires an extremely thorough justification. With regard to the prospective motivation and argument in favor of existence of evil in the world, the ethical positioning of the human soul, conceived of as a superior monad, capable of true understanding and a reflection of divine grace, can also be outlined. What place, therefore, does evil occupy in the Leibnizian universal equation and how is it possible to embody it from the perspective of free will? In a system of such predetermined order, what possibility is there for the existence of freedom? In this universal order, what place does absolute necessity, hypothetical necessity and moral necessity occupy? And what is their connection with the essential cosmic logical, geometrical and metaphysical principles? Do reason, will, and power, as absolute features of the Godhead, contribute to guaranteeing the ethical responsibility of higher monads? How does Leibniz bring together the predetermination and typology of fatality expressed through the paradigms: fatum mahometanum, fatum stoicum and fatum christianum? "Divinity as the first agent and man as the patient and second agent" - is a Leibnizian interpretation of the relation of predetermination. Evil and free will are recognized only in the framework of hypothetical necessity.  So, therefore, in the present work we will analyze, among other things, the Leibnizian interpretation of the ratio of predetermination, recalling the difference between being inclined and being forced in making a decision.