Board centrality and investment efficiency

IF 1.4 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Kambar Farooq, C. Chui, Muhammad Azeem
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

ABSTRACT We study whether firms with central network boards influence investment efficiency. The results demonstrate that board centrality enhances investment efficiency and mitigates overinvestment but show an insignificant impact on underinvestment. This asymmetric effect on over and underinvestment can be attributed to different roles played by executive (internal) directors and external directors on the board. Further analysis reveals that the board centrality and investment efficiency relationship is stronger for firms with higher managerial entrenchment and informational asymmetry problems. The findings support the notion that social capital, in the shape of board networks, improves monitoring and information environment, consequently enhancing investment efficiency.
董事会中心性与投资效率
摘要本文研究拥有中心网板的企业是否会影响投资效率。结果表明,董事会中心性提高了投资效率,缓解了过度投资,但对投资不足的影响不显著。这种对过度投资和投资不足的不对称效应可以归因于执行董事(内部)和外部董事在董事会中扮演的不同角色。进一步分析发现,在管理堑壕程度较高、存在信息不对称问题的企业中,董事会中心性与投资效率的关系更强。研究结果支持社会资本以董事会网络的形式改善监控和信息环境,从而提高投资效率的观点。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
9.10%
发文量
39
期刊介绍: The Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics (APJAE) is an international forum intended for theoretical and empirical research in all areas of economics and accounting in general. In particular, the journal encourages submissions in the following areas: Auditing, financial reporting, earnings management, financial analysts, the role of accounting information, international trade and finance, industrial organization, strategic behavior, market structure, financial contracts, corporate governance, capital markets, and financial institutions. The journal welcomes contributions related to the Asia Pacific region, and targets top quality research from scholars with diverse regional interests. The editors encourage submission of high quality manuscripts with innovative ideas. The editorial team is committed to an expedient review process.
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