R. Azarderakhsh, Jean-François Biasse, R. Khatib, Brandon Langenberg, Benjamin Pring
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
In this paper we study a strategy for adapting the “Tiny Claw” Grover-based attack of Biasse and Pring (A framework for reducing the overhead of the quantum oracle for use with Grover's algorithm with applications to cryptanalysis of SIKE, J. Math. Cryptol. 15 (2019), pp. 143–156) for attacking SIKE and abstract it under a realistic model of classical memory-access costs. Our results allow us to retain the almost quadratic reduction in the overheads involved with the implementing the quantum oracle in this cost model and demonstrate how the cost of the parallel version of this attack scales in a manner superior to that of a naive use of Grover’s algorithm. In order to investigate the utility of the Tiny Claw approach, we perform a quantum resource estimation of the classical and quantum resources required to attack various SIKE instances with Tiny Claw when when we are limited to hardware, finding interesting price-points.
在本文中,我们研究了一种策略,以适应Biasse和Pring基于Grover的“Tiny Claw”攻击(一种用于减少与Grover算法一起使用的量子预言器开销的框架,用于SIKE, J. Math的密码分析)。Cryptol. 15 (2019), pp. 143-156)攻击SIKE,并将其抽象在经典内存访问成本的现实模型下。我们的结果使我们能够保留在这个成本模型中实现量子预言器所涉及的开销的几乎二次减少,并演示了这种攻击的并行版本的成本如何以优于单纯使用Grover算法的方式进行扩展。为了研究Tiny Claw方法的效用,当我们限于硬件时,我们对使用Tiny Claw攻击各种SIKE实例所需的经典和量子资源进行了量子资源估计,找到了有趣的价格点。