Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion

IF 4.8 1区 社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
H. Farrell, Abraham L. Newman
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引用次数: 320

Abstract

Abstract Liberals claim that globalization has led to fragmentation and decentralized networks of power relations. This does not explain how states increasingly “weaponize interdependence” by leveraging global networks of informational and financial exchange for strategic advantage. The theoretical literature on network topography shows how standard models predict that many networks grow asymmetrically so that some nodes are far more connected than others. This model nicely describes several key global economic networks, centering on the United States and a few other states. Highly asymmetric networks allow states with (1) effective jurisdiction over the central economic nodes and (2) appropriate domestic institutions and norms to weaponize these structural advantages for coercive ends. In particular, two mechanisms can be identified. First, states can employ the “panopticon effect” to gather strategically valuable information. Second, they can employ the “chokepoint effect” to deny network access to adversaries. Tests of the plausibility of these arguments across two extended case studies that provide variation both in the extent of U.S. jurisdiction and in the presence of domestic institutions—the SWIFT financial messaging system and the internet—confirm the framework's expectations. A better understanding of the policy implications of the use and potential overuse of these tools, as well as the response strategies of targeted states, will recast scholarly debates on the relationship between economic globalization and state coercion.
武器化的相互依赖:全球经济网络如何塑造国家强制
自由主义者声称全球化导致了权力关系网络的分裂和分散。这并不能解释各国如何通过利用全球信息和金融交换网络来获取战略优势,从而日益“将相互依赖武器化”。关于网络地形的理论文献表明,标准模型预测许多网络的增长是不对称的,因此一些节点比其他节点连接得更多。这个模型很好地描述了以美国和其他几个国家为中心的几个关键的全球经济网络。高度不对称的网络允许拥有(1)对中心经济节点的有效管辖权和(2)适当的国内制度和规范的国家将这些结构性优势武器化,以达到强制目的。具体而言,可以确定两种机制。首先,各国可以利用“圆形监狱效应”来收集具有战略价值的信息。其次,他们可以利用“阻塞点效应”来阻止对手访问网络。通过两个扩展的案例研究,对这些论点的合理性进行了测试,这些案例研究提供了美国司法管辖范围和国内机构(SWIFT金融信息系统和互联网)存在的变化,证实了框架的预期。更好地理解这些工具的使用和潜在的过度使用的政策含义,以及目标国家的应对策略,将重塑关于经济全球化与国家强制之间关系的学术辩论。
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来源期刊
International Security
International Security Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
7.40
自引率
10.00%
发文量
13
期刊介绍: International Security publishes lucid, well-documented essays on the full range of contemporary security issues. Its articles address traditional topics of war and peace, as well as more recent dimensions of security, including environmental, demographic, and humanitarian issues, transnational networks, and emerging technologies. International Security has defined the debate on US national security policy and set the agenda for scholarship on international security affairs for more than forty years. The journal values scholarship that challenges the conventional wisdom, examines policy, engages theory, illuminates history, and discovers new trends. Readers of IS discover new developments in: The causes and prevention of war U.S.-China relations Great power politics Ethnic conflict and intra-state war Terrorism and insurgency Regional security in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America U.S. foreign and defense policy International relations theory Diplomatic and military history Cybersecurity and defense technology Political economy, business, and security Nuclear proliferation.
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