A low overhead hardware technique for software integrity and confidentiality

Abstract

Software integrity and confidentiality play a central role in making embedded computer systems resilient to various malicious actions, such as software attacks; probing and tampering with buses, memory, and I/O devices; and reverse engineering. In this paper we describe an efficient hardware mechanism that protects software integrity and guarantees software confidentiality. To provide software integrity, each instruction block is signed during program installation with a cryptographically secure signature. The signatures embedded in the code are verified during program execution. Software confidentiality is provided by encrypting instruction blocks. To achieve low performance overhead, the proposed mechanism combines several architectural enhancements: a variation of one-time-pad encryption, parallelizable signatures, and conditional execution of unverified instructions. A relatively high memory overhead due to embedded signatures can be reduced by protecting multiple instruction blocks with one signature, with minimal effects on complexity and performance overhead.