Impacts of Distributive Comparison Behavior on Corporate Social Responsibility in Supply Chains: The Role of Small Firms

Mingzheng Wang, X. Fang, Zizhuo Wang, Ying‐ju Chen
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Problem definition: In this paper, we explore how a firm’s concern about profit distribution and the size of downstream firms in supply chains affect corporate social responsibility (CSR) investment strategy. Methodology/results: In a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one manufacturer, both players decide whether to invest to reduce CSR violations, and they negotiate over a wholesale price. Distributive comparison behavior makes the manufacturer compare the profit with his equitable payoff, which is determined by the supplier’s profit. Advantageous (resp. disadvantageous) inequality occurs when the manufacturer’s profit is higher (resp. lower) than the manufacturer’s equitable payoff. We compare this supply chain to the one without distributive comparison behavior. We find that when advantageous inequality occurs, or when neither inequality occurs and the manufacturer’s sensitivity to the supplier’s profit is low, the manufacturer’s distributive comparison behavior makes the manufacturer less (resp. supplier more) likely to invest in CSR, which we call negative (resp. positive) impacts of distributive comparison behavior; otherwise, it makes the manufacturer more (resp. supplier less) likely to invest. In most cases, the weak bargaining power of the small manufacturer leads to larger positive or smaller negative impacts of distributive comparison behavior. Also, the low efficiency of the small manufacturer to reduce CSR violations leads to smaller negative impacts of distributive comparison behavior. Managerial implications: Our results show that governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) should investigate firms’ distributive comparison behavior in supply chains. When downstream firms show the aversion to lower (resp. higher) profits than ones from upstream firms, the measures to monitor and support upstream (resp. downstream) firms’ CSR investments should be taken to avoid CSR violations. In the supply chains with small downstream firms, extra efforts should be made to induce firms’ distributive comparison behavior. Funding: M. Wang was supported partially by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 71931009 and 71671023]; X. Fang is grateful for the support under a Lee Kong Chian Fellowship and Retail Centre of Excellence Research Grant; Z. Wang was supported partially by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72010107002, 71671023, and 72171212]; and Y. Chen was supported partially by the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China [HKUST C6020-21GF]. Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.1172 .
供应链中分配比较行为对企业社会责任的影响:小企业的作用
问题定义:本文探讨企业对利润分配和供应链下游企业规模的关注如何影响企业社会责任(CSR)投资策略。方法/结果:在由一个供应商和一个制造商组成的供应链中,双方决定是否投资以减少违反CSR的行为,并就批发价格进行谈判。分配比较行为是指制造商将利润与其公平报酬进行比较,而公平报酬是由供应商的利润决定的。优势(分别地。不利的)不平等发生在制造商的利润较高时(如:低于制造商的公平报酬。我们将这个供应链与没有分配比较行为的供应链进行比较。我们发现,当优势不平等发生时,或不存在优势不平等且制造商对供应商利润的敏感性较低时,制造商的分配比较行为使制造商较少(p < 0.05)。供应商更有可能投资于企业社会责任,我们称之为负(负)责任。分配比较行为的正向影响;否则,它会使制造商更有责任感。供应商不太可能投资。在大多数情况下,小制造商的议价能力较弱导致分配比较行为的积极影响较大或消极影响较小。同时,小型制造商减少企业社会责任违规行为的效率较低,导致分配比较行为的负面影响较小。管理启示:我们的研究结果表明,政府和非政府组织(ngo)应该调查企业在供应链中的分配比较行为。当下游企业表现出对低利率的厌恶时。高于上游企业的利润,监控和支持上游企业的措施(如:下游企业应采取企业社会责任投资来避免违反企业社会责任。在下游企业规模较小的供应链中,应额外努力诱导企业的分配比较行为。基金资助:王先生部分得到国家自然科学基金资助[基金项目:71931009和71671023];方先贤感谢李光前奖学金及零售卓越研究中心资助;王志强获国家自然科学基金项目(项目编号:72010107002、71671023、72171212)部分资助;及陈毅获中国香港特别行政区研究资助局的部分资助[HKUST C6020-21GF]。补充材料:电子伴侣可在https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.1172上获得。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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