Practical Considerations on the Notion of ‘Advantage’ and the Application of Market Economy Operator Test in the Context of Financial Instruments

IF 0.7 Q2 LAW
F. Dascalescu, M. Houtman
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This article focuses on the notion of ‘advantage’, as an element necessary for a national measure to be qualified as state aid. Behaving like a private economic operator implies that the state remains profitoriented and does not grant an advantage to a recipient undertaking (i.e., no aid). In order to determine that economic transactions carried out by public bodies do not confer an advantage on the recipient, the European courts have developed, as of the mid-1980s, a test which implies the comparison between the state and a private economic operator. This article focuses on a number of key issues arising when applying the ‘market economy operator test’ (MEOT) to Member States’ (MSs’) investments, especially in the area of financial instruments, e.g., equity or quasi-equity investments, loans or guarantees. The recent EU soft law indicates the forms that the MEOT may take and clarifies the state’s role in co-investments in financial instruments, together with private investors. The existing EU case-law may be useful for subtracting some principles to assist practitioners with designing financial products in line with the MEOT and avoid the negative effects of illegal aid recovery. We conclude that more proxies may be provided via soft law by the European Commission for designing financial products under the MEOT, in an effort to increase access to finance to European companies. state aid, MEOT, private investor, financial instruments, risk finance measures
金融工具背景下“优势”概念及市场经济经营者检验应用的实践思考
本文重点讨论了“优势”的概念,将其作为一项国家措施获得国家援助资格的必要因素。像私营经济经营者那样行事意味着国家仍然以利润为导向,不给予受助企业利益(即不提供援助)。为了确定由公共机构进行的经济交易不会给接受者带来利益,欧洲法院从1980年代中期开始制定了一项测试,将国家和私营经济经营者进行比较。本文重点讨论在将“市场经济运营商测试”(MEOT)应用于成员国(ms)投资时出现的一些关键问题,特别是在金融工具领域,例如股权或准股权投资、贷款或担保。最近的欧盟软法表明了MEOT可能采取的形式,并澄清了国家在与私人投资者共同投资金融工具中的作用。现有的欧盟判例法可能有助于减去一些原则,以帮助从业人员设计符合MEOT的金融产品,并避免非法援助回收的负面影响。我们的结论是,欧盟委员会可以通过软法律提供更多的代理,以设计MEOT下的金融产品,以增加欧洲公司获得融资的机会。国家援助、MEOT、民间投资者、金融工具、风险融资措施
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.90
自引率
25.00%
发文量
18
期刊介绍: Information not localized
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