{"title":"The Origins and Evolution of Vietnam's Doi Moi Foreign Policy of 1986","authors":"K. Path","doi":"10.1017/trn.2020.3","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Drawing on new archival evidence, this paper focuses on the origins of Vietnam's foreign economic policy of 1986, better known as doi moi (renovation). The existing scholarship contends that doi moi ideas emerged amid Vietnam's socio-economic crisis during the late 1970s through a bottom-up process of market-oriented activities by local authorities. I argue, however, that these scholars overlooked the early ideas of economically engaging the West to obtain advanced technology to raise the Vietnamese products’ quality, and therefore, their competitiveness in the socialist bloc. Following the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973, Vietnamese diplomats-turned reformists studied the role of western technology and capital investment in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Politburo entrusted Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Co Thach, a senior advisor to Hanoi's chief negotiator Le Duc Tho in Paris, to conduct a series of clandestine studies on the role of western technology in economic relations between East and West. Thach's learning about the West's technological revolution led them to the shocking conclusion that the Soviet bloc was at least a decade behind the West in technological development. The fear of Vietnam being trapped in economic backwardness propelled these reformers to advocate bold ideas of economically engaging the West in the post-Vietnam War era to extract advanced technology to support post-war economic development and modernisation. However, it took an economic crisis (1977–78), followed by another costly two-front war against Cambodia and China between 1979 and 1985, for reformist Nguyen Co Thach's ideas to prevail over the conservative faction's military-first policy.","PeriodicalId":23341,"journal":{"name":"TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2020.3","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"AREA STUDIES","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
Abstract Drawing on new archival evidence, this paper focuses on the origins of Vietnam's foreign economic policy of 1986, better known as doi moi (renovation). The existing scholarship contends that doi moi ideas emerged amid Vietnam's socio-economic crisis during the late 1970s through a bottom-up process of market-oriented activities by local authorities. I argue, however, that these scholars overlooked the early ideas of economically engaging the West to obtain advanced technology to raise the Vietnamese products’ quality, and therefore, their competitiveness in the socialist bloc. Following the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973, Vietnamese diplomats-turned reformists studied the role of western technology and capital investment in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Politburo entrusted Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Co Thach, a senior advisor to Hanoi's chief negotiator Le Duc Tho in Paris, to conduct a series of clandestine studies on the role of western technology in economic relations between East and West. Thach's learning about the West's technological revolution led them to the shocking conclusion that the Soviet bloc was at least a decade behind the West in technological development. The fear of Vietnam being trapped in economic backwardness propelled these reformers to advocate bold ideas of economically engaging the West in the post-Vietnam War era to extract advanced technology to support post-war economic development and modernisation. However, it took an economic crisis (1977–78), followed by another costly two-front war against Cambodia and China between 1979 and 1985, for reformist Nguyen Co Thach's ideas to prevail over the conservative faction's military-first policy.
摘要利用新的档案证据,本文重点研究1986年越南对外经济政策的起源,该政策被称为“革新”(doi moi)。现有的学者认为,在20世纪70年代末越南的社会经济危机中,通过地方当局自下而上的以市场为导向的活动,doi moi思想出现了。然而,我认为,这些学者忽视了早期的想法,即在经济上与西方接触,以获得先进的技术,以提高越南产品的质量,从而提高他们在社会主义阵营中的竞争力。1973年1月《巴黎和平协定》签订后,越南外交官出身的改革派研究了西方技术和资本投资在苏联和东欧的作用。越南中央政治局委托越南外交部副部长、河内首席谈判代表黎德寿(Le Duc Tho)在巴黎的高级顾问Nguyen Co Thach,对西方技术在东西方经济关系中的作用进行一系列秘密研究。Thach对西方技术革命的了解使他们得出了一个令人震惊的结论,即苏联集团在技术发展方面至少落后西方十年。由于担心越南陷入经济落后的困境,这些改革者提出了大胆的想法,即在后越南战争时期与西方进行经济合作,以获取先进技术,以支持战后经济发展和现代化。然而,直到1977年至1978年的经济危机,以及1979年至1985年间对柬埔寨和中国发动的另一场代价高昂的两线战争,改革派阮哥达(Nguyen Co Thach)的思想才战胜了保守派的先军政策。
期刊介绍:
TRaNS approaches the study of Southeast Asia by looking at the region as a place that is defined by its diverse and rapidly-changing social context, and as a place that challenges scholars to move beyond conventional ideas of borders and boundedness. TRaNS invites studies of broadly defined trans-national, trans-regional and comparative perspectives. Case studies spanning more than two countries of Southeast Asia and its neighbouring countries/regions are particularly welcomed.