The Political (In)stability of Funded Pension Systems

Q3 Social Sciences
R. Beetsma, Oliwia Komada, Krzysztof Makarski, Joanna Tyrowicz
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We analyze the political stability of capital funded social security. In particular, using a stylized theoretical framework we study the mechanisms behind governments capturing pension assets in order to lower current taxes. This is followed by an analysis of the analogous mechanisms in a fully-fledged overlapping generations model with intra-cohort heterogeneity. Funding is efficient in a Kaldor-Hicks sense. Individuals vote on capturing the accumulated pension assets and replacing the funded pension pillar with a pay-as-you-go scheme. We show that even if capturing assets reduces welfare in the long run, it always has sufficient political support from those alive at the moment of the vote.
基金养老金制度的政治稳定性
我们分析了资本资助社会保障的政治稳定性。特别是,我们使用一个程式化的理论框架来研究政府获取养老金资产以降低当前税收背后的机制。接下来是对具有队列异质性的完全成熟的重叠代模型中的类似机制的分析。从卡尔多-希克斯的角度来看,资金是有效的。个人投票决定收回累积的养老金资产,并用现收现付计划取代基金养老金支柱。我们表明,即使从长远来看,夺取资产会减少福利,但它总是能得到投票时活着的人的足够政治支持。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Social Security Bulletin
Social Security Bulletin Social Sciences-Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
0.00%
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0
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