Regulatory mechanisms combating judicial corruption and misconduct in India: a critical analysis

Abstract

ABSTRACT The paper examines regulatory mechanisms for combating judicial corruption and misconduct in India. It aims at a critical analysis of the regulatory mechanisms for both subordinate and higher courts. The study, inter alia, concludes that the regulatory mechanisms for subordinate courts lack conceptual clarity, suffer role ambiguity, and are bereft of functional autonomy; the powers and functions of these mechanisms are not clearly prescribed, and the procedures concerning complaints, inquiries and disciplinary actions are ad hoc. The mechanisms for subordinate courts are opaque, inaccessible, slow and ineffective. The paper also argues that the “in-house procedure” in the higher judiciary is inadequate, opaque, informal and judge-centric; it terms the “removal procedure” as rigid and ineffective. This paper recommends structural, organizational and functional reforms to strengthen regulatory mechanisms for the subordinate judiciary. For the higher judiciary, it proposes a constitutional body having adequate representation from a broad spectrum of the population.