Orange People: A Brief History of Transnational Liberation Networks in East Central Europe

Q2 Social Sciences
Fredo Arias-King
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Undoubtedly, the contagion effect from abroad is but one in the constellation of factors (mostly domestic) that make these liberations possible.2 And within this factor, the transnational Orange networks are also but one element. This article will focus on this specific aspect-the main Orange people that transcended borders to reach out to other Orange people.Because the numerous individuals and groups that have organized to overthrow communist and neocommunist regimes have a multiplicity of ideologies and goals-from liberal to patriotic to anarchist to religious to social-democratic to reformed-communist to simply outraged citizens-for simplicity, and despite its recent discomfiture, the label \"Orange\" to describe them collectively is used for this article. Besides Ukraine's event in late 2004, orange has been used by several opposition forces in the region, the most evident being Poland's \"Orange Alternative\" as well as Hungary's \"Orange Appeal\" and the journal Magyar narancs (Hungarian Orange).Similarly, because the regimes targeted by the Orange people also span different categorizations- from communist to pseudo-fascist to corrupt neocommunist to sultanistic to ultra-etatist to simply illiberal-in this article I also continue with an earlier hypothesis that the nature of such regimes cannot be easily defined by ideology or any well-constructed system of values. Their common denominator instead is a compulsion to engage in illiberal and antisocial behavior, perhaps carried over from a combination of Marxist-Leninist ideology and self-selection to and training in their respective nomenklatury. 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They may have an arrogant and inflated self-appraisal and may be excessively opinionated, self-assured and cocky [yet] may display a glib, superficial charm and can be quite voluble and verbally facile.3Vaclav Havel captured the essence of the nonideological struggle between Orange people and antisocials, while reflecting on the Velvet Revolution ten years later: \"I wouldn't answer that it was the victory of one ideology over another, of one state over another state. …","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"71 1","pages":"29-72"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2007-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Demokratizatsiya","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.15.1.29-72","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5

Abstract

"We have underestimated completely the processes taking place in Poland, Hungary and especially recently in East Germany, and their effect and influence on our society."1-Milos JakesDeposed Czechoslovak communist leaderNovember 25, 1989IntroductionThis article broadly traces a specific aspect of the transnational "effect and influence" (in Jake.'s words) of the processes of liberation in the past half-century in central and eastern Europe. It explores the origin of the transnational Orange networks, their interactions behind the Iron Curtain, their zenith in 1989 through 1991, reappearance in the partially reformed postcommunist space, and ends with their latest activities, before outlining a few generalizations in search of a theory for their origins and motivation. Undoubtedly, the contagion effect from abroad is but one in the constellation of factors (mostly domestic) that make these liberations possible.2 And within this factor, the transnational Orange networks are also but one element. This article will focus on this specific aspect-the main Orange people that transcended borders to reach out to other Orange people.Because the numerous individuals and groups that have organized to overthrow communist and neocommunist regimes have a multiplicity of ideologies and goals-from liberal to patriotic to anarchist to religious to social-democratic to reformed-communist to simply outraged citizens-for simplicity, and despite its recent discomfiture, the label "Orange" to describe them collectively is used for this article. Besides Ukraine's event in late 2004, orange has been used by several opposition forces in the region, the most evident being Poland's "Orange Alternative" as well as Hungary's "Orange Appeal" and the journal Magyar narancs (Hungarian Orange).Similarly, because the regimes targeted by the Orange people also span different categorizations- from communist to pseudo-fascist to corrupt neocommunist to sultanistic to ultra-etatist to simply illiberal-in this article I also continue with an earlier hypothesis that the nature of such regimes cannot be easily defined by ideology or any well-constructed system of values. Their common denominator instead is a compulsion to engage in illiberal and antisocial behavior, perhaps carried over from a combination of Marxist-Leninist ideology and self-selection to and training in their respective nomenklatury. Not all Communist Party members engaged in antisocial behavior and some were quite constructive to the reform process and human rights (in fact, regime moderates who played key liberating roles are also defined as Orange people here). It is also true that, with few known exceptions, the key individuals conforming the antisocial regimes were either communists or had actively participated in antisocial activities from within the apparat even after the liberalizing trends began. Such individuals change ideology and political orientations quite rapidly (the most common venue is from communist to either ultra-nationalist or unideological corrupt net-works), I use the label "antisocial" to describe the nature of such individuals and their regimes rather than "communist" or other labels, because it captures their collective essence in one word. The American Psychiatric Association defines antisocial as:fail[ure] to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behavior . . . such as destroying property, harassing others, stealing or pursuing illegal occupations. Persons with this disorder disregard the wishes, rights or feelings of others. They are frequently deceitful and manipulative in order to gain personal profit or pleasure. . . . They may repeatedly lie, use an alias, con others, or malinger. . . . They may have an arrogant and inflated self-appraisal and may be excessively opinionated, self-assured and cocky [yet] may display a glib, superficial charm and can be quite voluble and verbally facile.3Vaclav Havel captured the essence of the nonideological struggle between Orange people and antisocials, while reflecting on the Velvet Revolution ten years later: "I wouldn't answer that it was the victory of one ideology over another, of one state over another state. …
橙色人民:中欧东部跨国解放网络简史
“我们完全低估了波兰、匈牙利,尤其是最近在东德发生的进程,以及它们对我们社会的影响和影响。”——米洛什·杰克被废黜的捷克斯洛伐克共产党领导人1989年11月25日引言本文宽泛地追溯了跨国“影响和影响”的一个具体方面(在杰克。在过去的半个世纪中,中欧和东欧的解放进程。它探讨了跨国橙色网络的起源,他们在铁幕背后的互动,他们在1989年至1991年的顶峰,在部分改革的后共产主义空间中重现,并以他们的最新活动结束,然后概述了一些概括,以寻找他们的起源和动机的理论。毫无疑问,来自国外的传染效应只是使这些解放成为可能的众多因素之一(主要是国内因素)在这个因素中,跨国Orange网络也只是其中一个因素。这篇文章将关注这一特定的方面——主要的橙色人超越了边界,与其他橙色人接触。因为组织起来推翻共产主义和新共产主义政权的众多个人和团体有着多种多样的意识形态和目标——从自由主义到爱国主义到无政府主义,从宗教到社会民主主义再到改革派——从共产主义到仅仅是愤怒的公民——为了简单起见,尽管最近出现了混乱,但本文还是使用了“橙色”这个标签来描述他们。除了2004年底的乌克兰事件外,该地区的一些反对派力量也使用了橙色,最明显的是波兰的“橙色选择”、匈牙利的“橙色呼吁”和《匈牙利橙色》杂志。同样,因为橙色人民所针对的政权也跨越了不同的类别——从共产主义到伪法西斯主义,到腐败的新共产主义,到苏丹主义,到极端专制主义,再到简单的反自由主义——在本文中,我还将继续一个先前的假设,即这些政权的性质不能轻易地通过意识形态或任何精心构建的价值体系来定义。相反,他们的共同点是强迫自己从事不自由和反社会的行为,这可能是马克思列宁主义意识形态和自我选择的结合,并在各自的术语中进行训练。并非所有的共产党员都从事反社会行为,有些人对改革进程和人权相当有建设性(事实上,在这里发挥关键解放作用的政权温和派也被定义为橙色人)。此外,除了少数已知的例外,符合反社会政权的关键人物要么是共产主义者,要么是在自由化趋势开始之后从机器内部积极参与反社会活动的人。这些人的意识形态和政治取向变化非常快(最常见的是从共产主义者到极端民族主义者或无意识形态的腐败网络),我用“反社会”这个标签来描述这些人及其政权的本质,而不是“共产主义者”或其他标签,因为它抓住了他们的集体本质。美国精神病学协会将反社会定义为:不符合社会规范的合法行为…例如破坏财产、骚扰他人、偷窃或从事非法职业。患有这种疾病的人无视他人的愿望、权利或感受。他们经常欺骗和操纵,以获得个人利益或快乐. . . .他们可能反复撒谎,使用化名,欺骗他人,或装病. . . .他们可能有一种傲慢和膨胀的自我评价,可能过于固执己见、自信和自大,但也可能表现出油嘴滑舌、肤浅的魅力,而且可能非常健谈、语言流畅。瓦茨拉夫·哈维尔(vaclav Havel)在反思十年后的天鹅绒革命(Velvet Revolution)时,抓住了橙色人民与反社会分子之间非意识形态斗争的本质:“我不会回答说,这是一种意识形态对另一种意识形态的胜利,是一个国家对另一个国家的胜利。...
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来源期刊
Demokratizatsiya
Demokratizatsiya Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Occupying a unique niche among literary journals, ANQ is filled with short, incisive research-based articles about the literature of the English-speaking world and the language of literature. Contributors unravel obscure allusions, explain sources and analogues, and supply variant manuscript readings. Also included are Old English word studies, textual emendations, and rare correspondence from neglected archives. The journal is an essential source for professors and students, as well as archivists, bibliographers, biographers, editors, lexicographers, and textual scholars. With subjects from Chaucer and Milton to Fitzgerald and Welty, ANQ delves into the heart of literature.
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