{"title":"Orange People: A Brief History of Transnational Liberation Networks in East Central Europe","authors":"Fredo Arias-King","doi":"10.3200/DEMO.15.1.29-72","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\"We have underestimated completely the processes taking place in Poland, Hungary and especially recently in East Germany, and their effect and influence on our society.\"1-Milos JakesDeposed Czechoslovak communist leaderNovember 25, 1989IntroductionThis article broadly traces a specific aspect of the transnational \"effect and influence\" (in Jake.'s words) of the processes of liberation in the past half-century in central and eastern Europe. It explores the origin of the transnational Orange networks, their interactions behind the Iron Curtain, their zenith in 1989 through 1991, reappearance in the partially reformed postcommunist space, and ends with their latest activities, before outlining a few generalizations in search of a theory for their origins and motivation. Undoubtedly, the contagion effect from abroad is but one in the constellation of factors (mostly domestic) that make these liberations possible.2 And within this factor, the transnational Orange networks are also but one element. This article will focus on this specific aspect-the main Orange people that transcended borders to reach out to other Orange people.Because the numerous individuals and groups that have organized to overthrow communist and neocommunist regimes have a multiplicity of ideologies and goals-from liberal to patriotic to anarchist to religious to social-democratic to reformed-communist to simply outraged citizens-for simplicity, and despite its recent discomfiture, the label \"Orange\" to describe them collectively is used for this article. Besides Ukraine's event in late 2004, orange has been used by several opposition forces in the region, the most evident being Poland's \"Orange Alternative\" as well as Hungary's \"Orange Appeal\" and the journal Magyar narancs (Hungarian Orange).Similarly, because the regimes targeted by the Orange people also span different categorizations- from communist to pseudo-fascist to corrupt neocommunist to sultanistic to ultra-etatist to simply illiberal-in this article I also continue with an earlier hypothesis that the nature of such regimes cannot be easily defined by ideology or any well-constructed system of values. Their common denominator instead is a compulsion to engage in illiberal and antisocial behavior, perhaps carried over from a combination of Marxist-Leninist ideology and self-selection to and training in their respective nomenklatury. Not all Communist Party members engaged in antisocial behavior and some were quite constructive to the reform process and human rights (in fact, regime moderates who played key liberating roles are also defined as Orange people here). It is also true that, with few known exceptions, the key individuals conforming the antisocial regimes were either communists or had actively participated in antisocial activities from within the apparat even after the liberalizing trends began. Such individuals change ideology and political orientations quite rapidly (the most common venue is from communist to either ultra-nationalist or unideological corrupt net-works), I use the label \"antisocial\" to describe the nature of such individuals and their regimes rather than \"communist\" or other labels, because it captures their collective essence in one word. The American Psychiatric Association defines antisocial as:fail[ure] to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behavior . . . such as destroying property, harassing others, stealing or pursuing illegal occupations. Persons with this disorder disregard the wishes, rights or feelings of others. They are frequently deceitful and manipulative in order to gain personal profit or pleasure. . . . They may repeatedly lie, use an alias, con others, or malinger. . . . They may have an arrogant and inflated self-appraisal and may be excessively opinionated, self-assured and cocky [yet] may display a glib, superficial charm and can be quite voluble and verbally facile.3Vaclav Havel captured the essence of the nonideological struggle between Orange people and antisocials, while reflecting on the Velvet Revolution ten years later: \"I wouldn't answer that it was the victory of one ideology over another, of one state over another state. …","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"71 1","pages":"29-72"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2007-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Demokratizatsiya","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.15.1.29-72","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Abstract
"We have underestimated completely the processes taking place in Poland, Hungary and especially recently in East Germany, and their effect and influence on our society."1-Milos JakesDeposed Czechoslovak communist leaderNovember 25, 1989IntroductionThis article broadly traces a specific aspect of the transnational "effect and influence" (in Jake.'s words) of the processes of liberation in the past half-century in central and eastern Europe. It explores the origin of the transnational Orange networks, their interactions behind the Iron Curtain, their zenith in 1989 through 1991, reappearance in the partially reformed postcommunist space, and ends with their latest activities, before outlining a few generalizations in search of a theory for their origins and motivation. Undoubtedly, the contagion effect from abroad is but one in the constellation of factors (mostly domestic) that make these liberations possible.2 And within this factor, the transnational Orange networks are also but one element. This article will focus on this specific aspect-the main Orange people that transcended borders to reach out to other Orange people.Because the numerous individuals and groups that have organized to overthrow communist and neocommunist regimes have a multiplicity of ideologies and goals-from liberal to patriotic to anarchist to religious to social-democratic to reformed-communist to simply outraged citizens-for simplicity, and despite its recent discomfiture, the label "Orange" to describe them collectively is used for this article. Besides Ukraine's event in late 2004, orange has been used by several opposition forces in the region, the most evident being Poland's "Orange Alternative" as well as Hungary's "Orange Appeal" and the journal Magyar narancs (Hungarian Orange).Similarly, because the regimes targeted by the Orange people also span different categorizations- from communist to pseudo-fascist to corrupt neocommunist to sultanistic to ultra-etatist to simply illiberal-in this article I also continue with an earlier hypothesis that the nature of such regimes cannot be easily defined by ideology or any well-constructed system of values. Their common denominator instead is a compulsion to engage in illiberal and antisocial behavior, perhaps carried over from a combination of Marxist-Leninist ideology and self-selection to and training in their respective nomenklatury. Not all Communist Party members engaged in antisocial behavior and some were quite constructive to the reform process and human rights (in fact, regime moderates who played key liberating roles are also defined as Orange people here). It is also true that, with few known exceptions, the key individuals conforming the antisocial regimes were either communists or had actively participated in antisocial activities from within the apparat even after the liberalizing trends began. Such individuals change ideology and political orientations quite rapidly (the most common venue is from communist to either ultra-nationalist or unideological corrupt net-works), I use the label "antisocial" to describe the nature of such individuals and their regimes rather than "communist" or other labels, because it captures their collective essence in one word. The American Psychiatric Association defines antisocial as:fail[ure] to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behavior . . . such as destroying property, harassing others, stealing or pursuing illegal occupations. Persons with this disorder disregard the wishes, rights or feelings of others. They are frequently deceitful and manipulative in order to gain personal profit or pleasure. . . . They may repeatedly lie, use an alias, con others, or malinger. . . . They may have an arrogant and inflated self-appraisal and may be excessively opinionated, self-assured and cocky [yet] may display a glib, superficial charm and can be quite voluble and verbally facile.3Vaclav Havel captured the essence of the nonideological struggle between Orange people and antisocials, while reflecting on the Velvet Revolution ten years later: "I wouldn't answer that it was the victory of one ideology over another, of one state over another state. …
DemokratizatsiyaSocial Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍:
Occupying a unique niche among literary journals, ANQ is filled with short, incisive research-based articles about the literature of the English-speaking world and the language of literature. Contributors unravel obscure allusions, explain sources and analogues, and supply variant manuscript readings. Also included are Old English word studies, textual emendations, and rare correspondence from neglected archives. The journal is an essential source for professors and students, as well as archivists, bibliographers, biographers, editors, lexicographers, and textual scholars. With subjects from Chaucer and Milton to Fitzgerald and Welty, ANQ delves into the heart of literature.