Data Analytics and Skeptical Actions: The Countervailing Effects of False Positives and Consistent Rewards for Skepticism

Dereck Barr‐Pulliam, Joseph F. Brazel, Jennifer McCallen, Kimberly Walker
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引用次数: 14

Abstract

We investigate if varying rates of false positives impact auditor skepticism toward red flags identified by data analytic tools. We also examine the extent to which consistent rewards for skepticism can improve the application of skepticism on audits employing data analytics. Using an experiment with practicing auditors we observe that, when false positive rates are higher, skepticism levels are low. Importantly, both our lower and higher false positive conditions reflect well calibrated analytic tests. We also find that consistent rewards for skepticism significantly improve the skepticism of our auditors. However, the positive effect of rewards is limited, in that we do not see improvements in skepticism when the false positive rate is higher. Our findings highlight the importance of improving the calibration of analytic tests to reduce false positives and the need for a culture change where appropriate skepticism is consistently rewarded in order for audit firms to effectively use analytic tools to enhance audit quality.
数据分析和怀疑行为:假阳性的抵消效应和对怀疑的一致奖励
我们调查不同的误报率是否会影响审计师对数据分析工具识别的危险信号的怀疑态度。我们还研究了在多大程度上对怀疑的一致奖励可以改善对采用数据分析的审计的怀疑的应用。通过对执业审计师的实验,我们观察到,当误报率较高时,怀疑程度较低。重要的是,我们的低假阳性和高假阳性条件都反映了校准好的分析测试。我们还发现,对怀疑的持续奖励显著提高了审计师的怀疑态度。然而,奖励的积极作用是有限的,因为当假阳性率较高时,我们并没有看到怀疑态度的改善。我们的研究结果强调了改进分析测试的校准以减少误报的重要性,以及为了使审计公司有效地使用分析工具来提高审计质量,需要一种文化变革,在这种文化中,适当的怀疑一直得到奖励。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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