Public goods game with the moral dual process theory

Abstract

ABSTRACT It is the objective law of development of nature that natural selection and survival of the fittest are incorporated. As the reason that cooperation is not a predeterminate process or results, it is interesting to study the emergent phenomena of cooperation. Although providing a punishment option to community members of the public goods game (PGG) has been shown to effectively promote cooperation . In real life, people will sometimes help others even at the expense of their own costs. Reward behaviour is an important phenomenon of social, which emerges as a result of the interactions among individuals. In this article, we carry out the representative expansion for both positive and negative reciprocit ies to the PGG, which is based on the dual-process theory of morality. We research the evolution of group cooperation about PGG under the condition that punishment and reward exist. This result indicates that punishment and reward are significant in the emergence and stabilisation of cooperation. Our experimental results also provide valuable information about strategies for theories of evolutionary games and social dynamics.