The Effect of CSR Assurance and Explicit Assessment on Investor Valuation Judgments

Abstract

We examine whether CSR assurance increases investors' fundamental value estimates, whether this effect depends on the type of assurance (reasonable versus limited), and whether investors are prompted to explicitly assess the company's performance. We conduct a 3 × 2 between-subjects experiment, with CSR assurance being manipulated at three levels (no assurance, limited assurance, and reasonable assurance) and explicit assessment at two levels (no explicit assessment and explicit assessment). We find that when there is no prompt to explicitly assess performance, the investors who receive an assurance report at a reasonable level derive higher fundamental value estimates than the investors who receive CSR information that is not assured or assured at a limited level. Investors who receive either a reasonable or limited assurance level report perceive the information to be more reliable than the investors who receive CSR information that is not assured, regardless of the prompt for explicit assessment.