How Democracy Can Undermine Peace: The Israeli–Palestinian Case

Abstract

This study argues that democracy can, at times, undermine a peace process. Israel’s ‘overly’ democratic nature detracted from the potential success of the official peace process, from Oslo to Camp David, since its democratic–bureaucratic system diminished the influence of the moderate public opinion and vote. This argument is examined over two integrated and almost parallel timelines: the official peace process from 1991 to 2000 and Israel’s change in electoral systems from 1992 to 2001. This study is the first to integrate these two processes—negotiations and elections—in a single empirical approach. I conclude that while the Israeli public shifted from a negative to a positive stance toward a Palestinian state, the Israeli government shifted in the opposite direction, from the success of Oslo to the failure of Camp David. Original electoral findings were analyzed after a personal visit to the Israeli Knesset.