Optimal Grants and Subsidies for Development Supply Chains: Case of Solar Lanterns in Haiti

James Knuckles, M. Sodhi, Christopher S. Tang, Jiayi Joey Yu
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Problem definition: In supply chains for subsidised products sold to low income families, there is a question about who should be subsidised in the supply chain and to what extent, and whether retail competition or having substitutable products matters. Academic/practical relevance: By introducing and analyzing “development supply chains” in which transactions are commercial but grants and subsidies are needed for affordability, we show that donors such as USAID or World Bank need to understand and exploit supply chain structure, including retail competition and product subsitutability. Methodology: We develop stylised models to analyse optimal grants and subsidies for a three-echelon supply chain of manufacturers, retailers and consumers. Successive models focus on manufacturers and grants, and on retailers and consumers, adding substitutable products and competition in retail. Results: A “lump-sum” grant enables the donor to generate an indirect incentive for the manufacturer to make R&D investment to reduce its own unit cost and a direct incentive to reduce its wholesale price for retailers. The donor can subsidize either the retailer or the customer, and the total subsidy per unit has an optimal level. Having choice between a more preferred and a less preferred substitutable product can increase the number of beneficiaries. Subsidizing competing retailers can increase the number of beneficiaries although at the expense of reduced margins (but higher units sold). In all cases, margins for the retailer echelon remain positive, supporting the “development” goal. Managerial implications: Donors must coordinate within different programmes along the entire supply chain. They must encourage substitutable products with support for higher quality, higher cost products as well as retail competition. Unit subsidies to the retailer, micro-entrepreneur, or customer are economically equivalent, so transaction costs should drive the decision for where to subsidise the supply chain.
发展供应链的最佳赠款和补贴:以海地太阳能灯为例
问题定义:在向低收入家庭出售补贴产品的供应链中,存在一个问题,即供应链中谁应该得到补贴,补贴到什么程度,以及零售竞争或拥有可替代产品是否重要。学术/实践相关性:通过引入和分析“发展供应链”,其中交易是商业的,但需要赠款和补贴来支付,我们表明,像美国国际开发署或世界银行这样的捐助者需要理解和利用供应链结构,包括零售竞争和产品可替代性。方法:我们开发了程式化的模型来分析制造商、零售商和消费者三级供应链的最佳补助金和补贴。后续的模型关注制造商和补助金,以及零售商和消费者,增加了可替代产品和零售中的竞争。结果:“一次性”资助使捐助者能够间接激励制造商进行研发投资以降低其自身的单位成本,并直接激励零售商降低其批发价格。供给者既可以补贴零售商,也可以补贴消费者,每单位总补贴有一个最优水平。在更受欢迎和不太受欢迎的替代产品之间进行选择可以增加受益者的数量。补贴竞争的零售商可以增加受益者的数量,尽管代价是利润率降低(但销量增加)。在所有情况下,零售商梯队的利润率都保持正值,支持“发展”目标。管理意义:捐助者必须在整个供应链上的不同项目中进行协调。他们必须鼓励可替代产品,支持更高质量、更高成本的产品以及零售竞争。对零售商、微型企业家或消费者的单位补贴在经济上是相等的,因此交易成本应该推动对何处补贴供应链的决策。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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