Interpretation, Realism, and Truth: Is Peirce’s Second Grade of Clearness Independent of the Third?

IF 0.2 4区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY Pub Date : 2021-02-04 DOI:10.2979/TRANCHARPEIRSOC.56.3.03

A. Wilson

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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Abstract:Most specialists agree that Peirce upholds his abstract definitions of reality and truth simultaneously and consistently with his pragmatic clarifications of those concepts. But some might assume that his pragmatic clarifications (the third grade of clearness) restrict the extensions of abstract definitions (the second grade of clearness), such that anything real must both be independent of what anyone thinks about it, per the abstract definition, and be an object of the would-be “final opinion”, per the pragmatic clarification. I call this reading Interpretive Dependence of the second grade of clearness on the third grade. In contrast, on Interpretive Independence, which I defend here, a concept can have a different extension on the second grade than it has on the third grade, such that it could be true, in a purely abstract sense, that there are realities that can never be known (metaphysical realism). “True” here must also be interpreted only according to an abstract definition, namely, one which Peirce endorses in 1906 and which, I argue, is a deflationary definition. Interpretive Independence not only allows Peirce to explain the intuitive appeal of metaphysical realism, while at the same time rejecting it, it also allows him to explain how there can be truths about fictional objects and truths in pure mathematics.

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阐释、现实主义与真理:皮尔斯的第二清晰等级独立于第三清晰等级吗?

摘要:大多数专家一致认为，皮尔斯对实在和真理的抽象定义与他对这些概念的实用主义澄清是同时一致的。但有些人可能会认为，他的语用澄清(第三级清晰)限制了抽象定义(第二级清晰)的扩展，因此，根据抽象定义，任何真实的东西都必须独立于任何人对它的看法，并且根据语用澄清，成为可能的“最终意见”的对象。我把这种阅读解释依赖叫做二年级对三年级的理解依赖。相反，在解释性独立理论中，我在这里要捍卫的是，一个概念在二年级时的延伸范围与在三年级时的延伸范围不同，因此，在纯粹抽象的意义上，它可能是真的，存在永远不可能被认识的现实(形而上学实在论)。这里的“正确”也只能根据一个抽象的定义来解释，也就是皮尔斯在1906年赞同的定义，我认为这是一个通货紧缩的定义。解释独立性不仅使皮尔斯能够解释形而上学实在论的直观吸引力，同时又拒绝它，还使他能够解释关于虚构对象的真理和纯数学中的真理是如何存在的。

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来源期刊

TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S PEIRCE SOCIETY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.70

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society has been the premier peer-reviewed journal specializing in the history of American philosophy since its founding in 1965. Although named for the founder of American pragmatism, American philosophers of all schools and periods, from the colonial to the recent past, are extensively discussed. TCSPS regularly includes essays, and every significant book published in the field is discussed in a review essay. A subscription to the journal includes membership in the Charles S. Peirce Society, which was founded in 1946 by Frederic H. Young. The purpose of the Society is to encourage study of and communication about the work of Peirce and its ongoing influence in the many fields of intellectual endeavor to which he contributed.