Cities and Stability: Urbanization, Redistribution, and Regime Survival in China

J. Wallace
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引用次数: 145

Abstract

Cities bring together masses of people, allow them to communicate and hide, and to transform private grievances into political causes, often erupting in urban protests that can destroy regimes. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has shaped urbanization via migration restrictions and redistributive policy since 1949 in ways that help account for the regime's endurance, China's surprising comparative lack of slums, and its curious moves away from urban bias over the past decade. Cities and Stability details the threats that cities pose for authoritarian regimes, regime responses to those threats, and how those responses can backfire by exacerbating the growth of slums and cities. Cross-national analyses of nondemocratic regime survival link larger cities to shorter regimes. To compensate for the threat urban threat, many regimes, including the CCP, favor cities in their policy-making. Cities and Stability shows this urban bias to be a Faustian Bargain, stabilizing large cities today but encouraging their growth and concentration over time. While attempting to industrialize, the Chinese regime created a household registration (hukou) system to restrict internal movement, separating urban and rural areas. China's hukou system served as a loophole, allowing urbanites to be favored but keeping farmers in the countryside. As these barriers eroded with economic reforms, the regime began to replace repression-based restrictions with economic incentives to avoid slums by improving economic opportunities in the interior and the countryside. Yet during the global Great Recession of 2008-09, the political value of the hukou system emerged as migrant workers, by the tens of millions, left coastal cities and dispersed across China's interior villages, counties, and cities. The government's stimulus policies, a combination of urban loans for immediate relief and long-term infrastructure aimed at the interior, reduced discontent to manageable levels and locales. Available in OSO:
城市与稳定:中国的城市化、再分配与政权生存
城市将广大人民聚集在一起,允许他们交流和隐藏,并将私人不满转化为政治原因,往往爆发为可以摧毁政权的城市抗议活动。自1949年以来,中国共产党通过移民限制和再分配政策塑造了城市化,这有助于解释政权的持久性,中国令人惊讶的相对缺乏贫民窟,以及在过去十年中摆脱城市偏见的奇怪举动。《城市与稳定》详细介绍了城市对专制政权构成的威胁、政权对这些威胁的反应,以及这些反应如何通过加剧贫民窟和城市的增长而适得其反。对非民主政权生存的跨国分析将大城市与较短的政权联系起来。为了弥补城市威胁,包括中国共产党在内的许多政权在制定政策时都倾向于城市。《城市与稳定》表明,这种对城市的偏见是一种浮士德式的交易,在今天稳定大城市的同时,也鼓励它们随着时间的推移而增长和集中。在试图实现工业化的过程中,中国政府建立了户口制度,以限制内部流动,将城市和农村地区分开。中国的户口制度是一个漏洞,允许城市居民得到优待,但把农民留在农村。随着这些障碍随着经济改革而消失,该政权开始用经济激励措施取代基于镇压的限制,通过改善内陆和农村的经济机会来避免贫民窟。然而,在2008-09年的全球经济大衰退期间,数以千万计的农民工离开沿海城市,分散到中国内陆的村庄、县和城市,户口制度的政治价值随之显现。政府的刺激政策,即为城市提供即时救助的贷款和针对内地的长期基础设施建设相结合,将不满情绪降低到了可控的水平和地方。可在OSO:
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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