Original Facticity and the Incompleteness of Knowledge

Q2 Arts and Humanities
M. Gómez-Alonso
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This article critically explores Nuno Venturinha’s project of capturing how we are situated in reality, a project grounded in the conviction that the closure of knowledge and the openness of experience are compatible. To this end, I will explore how an approach complementary to Venturinha’s method—one which regards the passive and the active in knowledge as rooted in a single, underlying original form of consciousness—would deal with the issue of justifying contingency without falling into either scepticism or empiricism.
原始真实性与知识的不完全性
本文批判性地探讨了Nuno Venturinha关于捕捉我们如何处于现实中的项目,该项目基于知识的封闭性和经验的开放性是相容的信念。为此,我将探索一种与文图里尼亚的方法互补的方法——一种将知识中的被动和主动视为根植于单一的、潜在的、原始的意识形式的方法——将如何处理证明偶然性的问题,而不会陷入怀疑主义或经验主义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Logos and Episteme
Logos and Episteme Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
0.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
10
审稿时长
20 weeks
期刊介绍: the journal publishes articles, reviews or discussion notes focused as well on problems concerning the general theory of knowledge, as on problems specific to the philosophy, methodology and ethics of science, philosophical logic, metaphilosophy, moral epistemology, epistemology of art, epistemology of religion, social or political epistemology, epistemology of communication. Studies in the history of science and of the philosophy of knowledge, or studies in the sociology of knowledge, cognitive psychology, and cognitive science are also welcome.
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