The Role of Skewness in Mergers and Acquisitions

IF 0.9 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
R. J. Delisle, N. Walcott
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Investors prefer stocks with idiosyncratic skewness in their returns, which may be evidence of behavioral biases. Previous research suggests that skewness is related to the choice of target in corporate acquisitions, which may reflect CEOs’ behavioral biases. However, if the acquiring firms’ stock returns are also skewed, then the acquirer CEOs may rationally use their stock as currency in these deals. We investigate the skewness of the acquiring firm and the method of payment to determine if takeovers involving high skewness stocks are consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. We find that firms with high levels of skewness are more likely to become takeover targets and that takeover premiums increase with skewness, but there is no relation between the target’s skewness level and acquirer announcement returns. We also find that acquirers with high skewness are more likely to pay with stock and have higher announcement returns. We conclude that acquirer CEOs often take advantage of investor preference for skewness when undertaking mergers and acquisitions activity.
偏度在并购中的作用
投资者更喜欢回报异常偏态的股票,这可能是行为偏差的证据。以往的研究表明,偏度与企业收购目标的选择有关,这可能反映了ceo的行为偏差。然而,如果收购方的股票回报也存在偏差,那么收购方首席执行官可能会在这些交易中合理地使用他们的股票作为货币。我们研究了收购公司的偏度和支付方式,以确定涉及高偏度股票的收购是否与股东财富最大化相一致。我们发现,偏度高的企业更有可能成为收购目标,收购溢价随着偏度的增加而增加,但目标的偏度水平与收购方公告收益之间没有关系。我们还发现,高偏度的收购者更有可能以股票支付,并有更高的公告回报。我们的结论是,收购方首席执行官在进行并购活动时经常利用投资者对偏倚的偏好。
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来源期刊
Quarterly Journal of Finance
Quarterly Journal of Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Quarterly Journal of Finance publishes high-quality papers in all areas of finance, including corporate finance, asset pricing, financial econometrics, international finance, macro-finance, behavioral finance, banking and financial intermediation, capital markets, risk management and insurance, derivatives, quantitative finance, corporate governance and compensation, investments and entrepreneurial finance.
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